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ABSTRACT 
Downloading software from unknown sources constitutes a great risk. Studies have described 
file-sharing networks where the probability of downloading infected files is as high as 70% 
[1] under certain circumstances.  
 
This work presents theory on malicious software with emphasize on code turning computers 
into bots and thereby, possibly botnets. It is observed that malware authors start using more 
advanced techniques to deceive owners of compromised computers. To evade detection, 
stealth techniques known from rootkits are more and more commonly adapted. Rootkit 
technology is therefore studied to be able to determine how bots, and other forms malicious 
software, can be hidden from both automated anti-virus detection mechanisms and human 
inspections of computers.  
 
The mechanisms used to evade detection by traditional anti-virus tools are in many cases 
effective.  Dynamic behavioural analysis of software during installation is therefore suggested 
as a strategy to supplement the traditional tools. Several detection strategies are presented, 
which can be used to determine the behaviour of software during installation. This knowledge 
is used to design a laboratory environment capable of detecting the mentioned categories of 
malicious code. 
 
An implementation of the laboratory is provided, and experiments are performed to determine 
the usefulness of the setup. The software used to set up the laboratory environment are all 
distributed free of license cost. An evaluation is made and improvements to the system are 
proposed.  
 
The value of behavioural analysis has been demonstrated, and the functionality of the 
laboratory environment has proved to extremely useful. Advanced users will find the 
functionality of the laboratory setup powerful. However, future work has to be done to 
automate the behavioural detection processes so the public can benefit from this work.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Application sharing and distribution on the Internet, where the source is unknown, constitute a 
risk to the overall Internet security. Often different kinds of malicious code are spread by 
manipulating applications to contain unwanted, hidden functionality. The software behaviour 
introduced by ill-intentioned programmers is hard to discover before it is too late. An infected 
computer may become a relay for e-mail spam, a node in a distributed denial-of-service attack 
or a stepping-stone for further attacks. These are a few examples, and only the imagination of 
programmers writing malicious code limit the possibilities.  
 
The threat mentioned above is real. The risk of downloading files with malicious content 
through file sharing networks is documented by Shin et al [1], who studied the popular peer-
to-peer network Kazaa. They found that from the more than 500.000 files they investigated, 
approximately 15% contained malicious code. When the keyword “ICQ” was used in the 
search queries, the chances of hitting an infected file was more than 70%. Kalafut et al [2] did 
a similar study on the Limewire and OpenFT peer-to-peer-networks. Their report shows that 
68% of all downloaded executables and archives in the Limewire and only 3% in the OpenFT 
network were infected.  
 
These numbers speak for themselves. One should not give unconditional trust to anything 
downloaded from unknown sources on the Internet. 
 
Malware is a term frequently used throughout this report. It is used as a collective term 
referring to all categories of malicious code in general. The word virus, which is commonly 
used in the same context, is one of several other categories of malicious code included in the 
malware term.  
  
1.1. Motivation 
The basis of this master’s thesis started out as a subject of conversation between the ICT 
security manager and the security professionals at SINTEF ICT. The topic of discussion was 
how to determine whether software downloaded from Internet contains hidden malicious 
functionality or not. Software downloaded from an unknown source with unknown content is 
every ICT security manager’s nightmare. 
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Botnets and bot code, presented in section 2.2 and 2.3 respectively, are evolutions of 
traditional malware; from standalone malicious applications to making compromised hosts 
playing together in ill-intentioned distributed networks. The evolution of malware is a 
continuously ongoing process, and it is a constant battle between developers of malicious 
software and anti-virus vendors. It is like a cat and mouse race. Traditionally, detection 
schemes have been based on signature recognition of known malicious software or activity. 
However, attackers are constantly improving their code to evade the traditional detection 
algorithms.  
 
Code obfuscation using e.g. steganography, cryptography, polymorphism and metamorphism1 
are well known techniques, which in many cases effectively prevents anti-virus tools from 
detecting the malicious content. If the protection shields are successfully circumvented, 
unwanted ill-natured software can be installed on a computer without the owner’s knowledge.  
 
As new signature files for detection are created, distributed and installed, malware previously 
installed on computers can be discovered and disabled. To prevent this from happening, 
malware creators may utilize techniques to stay undetected permanently. The very operating 
system of a computer can be altered to hide the presence of malicious content. Such 
techniques are known from a malware category called rootkits, further described in section 
2.4. Canavan [3] reports that more and more bot code implements rootkit functionality to 
evade detection.  
 
Sandboxing is a relatively new approach to behavioural malware detection, and the technique 
has proved to be valuable [4, 5]. The idea is to provide the malicious code with a secure 
environment where it can be executed as in “real life”. An application’s behaviour is observed 
within the sandbox and, based on the behaviour it may be classified as malicious or not. A 
sandboxed environment does not allow software to communicate with the Internet. However, 
a trend among malware authors, presented by Symantec [Web1], is to use staged downloads 
of malware: 
 
                                                 
1 Polymorphism and metamorphism are explained in section 2.3.1.2 
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- Trojan applications are spread on the Internet. These Trojans do not contain any viral 
code themselves, thus they are not blocked by anti-virus software.  
- When these Trojans are run, malicious files are downloaded from the Internet and 
installed.  
 
Also benign applications like Google Desktop [Web37] use this technique. A small 
installation package is downloaded from Internet; this application points to Google’s 
repositories where the latest version of the Google Desktop software is contained. Updated 
software is downloaded and executed when the installer file is run. A modern behavioural 
analysis environment designed to detect unwanted functionality in downloaded applications, 
should for these reasons, also allow controlled connections to Internet. 
 
1.2. Outline of this Thesis  
With this introduction, it is possible to see the shortcomings of traditional protection 
mechanisms. This master’s thesis will focus on looking at dynamic analysis of software 
during the installation process, and immediately after the software is installed.  
 
Dynamic analysis is interpreted synonymous with behavioural analysis throughout this report. 
The idea is to observe software’s behaviour to try do determine whether unwanted hidden 
functionality is present or not. 
 
The main tasks of this project were identified as to:  
 
1. Study literature on the subjects of botnets, rootkits and malicious software in general 
2. Based on the literature, develop a method/laboratory setup to be able to detect hidden 
malicious software functionality with special focus on bot software and rootkits: 
2.1. Through dynamic host-based detection –  studying activity on the host itself, like 
observing library calls, running processes, file integrity and more, during and 
immediately after installation 
2.2. Through dynamic network-based detection – studying network related activity 
during and immediately after software installation 
3. Do experiments in the laboratory environment studying examples of bot code and 
rootkits. 
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4. Evaluate the value of the methods used based on the experiment results and the 
literature study. 
 
The intention behind this master’s thesis is to develop an analysis environment that can be 
used in the process of gaining trust in applications downloaded from Internet. Sandbox 
principles should be used, but with the trends of staged malware downloads, observed by 
Symantec [Web1], in mind. The analysis results can be used e.g. by ICT managers to make 
decisions of whether certain software should be allowed or not. The work presented in this 
report contributes to existing research in the following areas: 
 
1) The dynamic behavioural analysis environment presented in this report is practically 
free of software cost. The only license cost associated, is connected to the operating 
system for which the analyzed malware is intended. 
2) High-interaction honeypot tools are utilized in a new setting to be able to better 
control the test environment during tests of e.g. software dependant on an Internet 
connection to install.  
3) The laboratory design is based on descriptions of botnet and rootkit characteristics, 
combined with updated research on behavioural malware detection principles. Bot 
functionality is detected during installation, rather than detecting already infected 
machines through network traffic analysis. 
 
1.3. Related Work 
Behavioural malware analysis is previously described by Szor [6] and Skoudis [7]. Virtual 
machine technology is proposed as a flexible solution for building the laboratory 
environment. Norman, a Norwegian anti-virus company, has developed a technology called 
Norman Sandbox [4] which is an automatic behavioural analysis environment based on 
emulated operating systems and services. Panda Software has released a heuristic scanning 
engine called Panda TruePrevent [Web17], which uses behavioural analysis to determine the 
presence of previously unknown malware. Spitzner [8] presents honeypot technology to study 
hacker behaviour. Research on botnet characteristics are documented, e.g. in [9, 10] and 
rootkits in [11]. 
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It has proven difficult to find descriptions of behavioural analysis environments solely based 
on free software. In addition, those environments that are presented are specifically designed 
as totally isolated systems without any support for controlled connection to Internet. 
Technologies like Norman Sandbox and Panda TruePrevent represent the direction that the 
anti-malware industry is moving towards, but to keep their competitive advantage these 
companies keep their products and technologies proprietary. Most research papers currently 
published on botnets either describe the functionality of a botnet and its area of application, or 
botnet detection through network traffic analysis. Honeypot technology is designed and used 
to study hacker activity from the Internet towards compromised hosts. It is not found 
documentation of honeypot technology in use to increase the flexibility of behavioural 
analysis environments.  
 
1.4. Limitations 
The work presented in this report is focused towards analysis of malware designed for the MS 
Windows operating system. It has not been considered whether any aspects of the malware 
descriptions or detection schemes apply to other operating system. 
 
Due to time constraints and complexity of building one single automated behavioural analysis 
tool from scratch, existing software will be utilized. Malware detection theory will be 
presented and analysis tools will be chosen based on properties described in these theories. 
All software used in the laboratory environment shall be free of software cost. It has not been 
considered whether any commercial applications are better suited than the utilities presented 
in this report. 
 
Even though it should be possible to analyze malware, and even benign software, on a general 
basis in the laboratory environment presented, the focus will be on detecting dynamic 
behaviour of bot software and rootkits to limit the scope of this work. 
 
A tool called ProcessMonitor, presented in section 3.2.2.4, will be used during the 
experimentation phase to log every registry-, file- and process event performed on the 
operating system during the tests. Time constrains will make it difficult to analyze every 
aspect of the collected log data. Event monitoring is therefore limited to the insertion of 
registry keys, creation of files and the creation of processes caused by the objects that are to 
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be analyzed. These properties are presented by Szor [6] as especially interesting attributes to 
study. In addition, it is observed which libraries are loaded into suspicious processes, to be 
able to say something about what functionality they most probably are designed with.  
 
1.5. Presentation of Previous Work 
During the fall 2006, a project assignment was written where techniques for detecting 
malware through a network-based perspective was explored [12]. The goal of this assignment 
was to determine whether networking characteristics like local and remote listing of 
communication ports and observation of network traffic could help finding unwanted 
malicious functionality during, or immediately after, installation of software. The work led to 
the design of a laboratory used for a behavioural analysis of software in a network related 
perspective. The laboratory setup was developed based on three different roles: a victim, an 
eavesdropper and an attacker.  
 
The victim was the host computer where software to be explored was installed. In addition to 
the suspicious software, other useful network related analysis tools were installed to help keep 
track of the network activity. Mainly these tools were used to observe port status before and 
after installation of the application to be scrutinized. 
 
The eavesdropper was used to collect information about the network activity. A network 
analyzer collecting every data packet sent on the wire, and an intrusion detection system 
automatically looking for suspicious activity were used. The victim, the attacker and the 
eavesdropper roles were installed on separate computers to avoid manipulation of log data by 
malware controlling the victim. 
 
The attacker was used to do remote, active scanning of the victim. A port scanner and a 
remote vulnerability scanner were utilized. The port scanner was used to collect port status, 
which could be compared to results returned by local tools on the victim. The remote 
vulnerability scanner was used to see if the software installed on the victim had introduced 
new vulnerabilities to the host. In this process, network activity simulating traffic generated 
by real life attacker tools was sent to see if the victim responded. During this process known 
backdoors and other malware could be detected.  
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Figure 1: Design of laboratory environment used in the project assignment of fall 2006 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the laboratory environment designed during the project assignment. Bond 
had the role of the victim; Drew was the eavesdropper and Marple the attacker. The logo 
images illustrate which operating systems and which tools were installed on the different 
machines. In addition to the three roles mentioned, a web server, represented by Poirot was 
introduced to the network. During the test phase it turned out that some malware specimens 
did not become active before certain web pages was visited. The web server was used to lure 
the malicious code to activate their networking properties. Sherlock was implemented as a 
firewall to control the traffic to and from Internet. 
 
In the test phase, malware in general was considered. None of the different malware 
categories received more attention than others. One IRC based bot, a keylogger and a virus 
was examined. Google Desktop [Web37] was analyzed as an illustration of a benign 
application.  
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The project report concluded that network-based detection can be used to discover certain 
types of malware. Network worms are typically detected when they start scanning for new 
victims. Other types of malware, like e.g. those activated by certain types of web page 
content, are not likely to be discovered solely based on detection through networking 
characteristics.  
 
The main ideas of network-based detection, presented in the project report of fall 2006 [12], 
build the foundation for the laboratory environment introduced later in this report. 
Improvements to the initial setup are introduced in the following work. The main differences 
are to move away from licensed software, building an environment totally free of software 
cost, and to make the laboratory setup much more secure from being infected with the 
malicious code to be analyzed. Further, techniques to observe malware behaviour on the 
victim host are introduced. Instead of looking at malware in general, the focus of detection 
will be on bot-code and malicious stealth properties.  
 
Further descriptions of differences and improvements separating the setup presented here and 
the new laboratory setup can be found in chapter 3.3.  
 
1.6. Research Method 
The research process used in this work is separated into four phases, as described in section 
1.2. A literature study will help determine which threats are faced, and present current 
research on how to detect the presence of these. The next phase is to convert the theoretic 
knowledge acquired into a physical realization of a behavioural analysis environment for 
software. The third phase is to use both the theoretical and practical skills to analyze software 
to try to detect unwanted software functionality, and fourth; determine the quality of the 
environment developed.    
 
In the analysis phase, the process illustrated in Figure 2 is used. A baseline of the test 
environment is created initially. Each of the analysis tools is used in a data collection phase to 
determine the state of a known clean system. Next, the application to be scrutinized is 
installed. A new data collection phase is performed, and the results compared to the baseline. 
Deviations in the collected results are most likely introduced by the newly installed 
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application. In addition, all file-, registry- and process events generated during installation are 
recorded. Based on this, it may be possible to determine the presence of unwanted hidden 
software functionality.  
 
 
D
ata C
ollection
Install new software
and
monitor events
D
ata C
ollection
Clean system
Compare
Phase 3: 
Analyze software
 
Figure 2: Research process used in the analysis process 
 
To sum up the analysis phase:  
1. Update every tool and operating system from reliable sources.  
2. Perform data collection on the current, clean system state.  
3. Install the application to be analysed and record events.  
4. Perform data collection on the new system state. 
5. Compare and analyse the results. 
6. Revert the virtual machine to a clean state and start over with step 1.  
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1.7. Structure of the Report 
Following is an overview of the different chapters. 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter presents some background information and the outline of this thesis.  
 
Chapter 2: Basics 
Chapter 2 introduces basic knowledge about malware with a special emphasize on botnet, bot 
software and rootkits. Behavioral malware detection techniques are also presented. The theory 
presented in this chapter builds the foundation for the design of the laboratory environment. 
 
Chapter 3: Laboratory Environment 
Chapter 3 presents the hardware and software used in the laboratory setup. The laboratory 
design is presented and argued for. 
 
Chapter 4: Experiments and Results 
In chapter 4, the experiments performed and their result are presented. One thorough example 
is given on the analysis process. The most important findings of the other tests are 
summarized at the end.  
 
Chapter 5: Discussion 
This chapter evaluates the laboratory environment, and future work is presented. 
 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Chapter 6 concludes the report. 
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2. Malware 
In this chapter an introduction to common categories of malware is presented. Next, botnets, 
bot software and rootkits are presented in more detail. The information introduced will build 
the foundation for setting up a laboratory environment and account for the reasoning behind 
choosing detection techniques presented later in this report; detection techniques used in the 
process of discovering malicious software functionality. 
 
2.1. Introduction to Malware 
Before digging further into the details of botnets and rootkits, a brief introduction to the 
classic malware categories is appropriate. A basic understanding of the principles behind 
these concepts will help comprehend the threat faced regarding botnets. 
 
2.1.1.1.Viruses 
“A virus is a self-replicating piece of code that attaches itself to other programs and usually 
requires human interaction to propagate.” [7]  Viruses need user interaction to be able to 
replicate. The virus replicates by copying itself to other files or boot sectors of disks once an 
infected file is opened. The danger of infection is kept within the local host or storage devices 
physically connected to this. Other computers risk contamination if storage devices containing 
malicious code are moved between computers or if an ignorant user transmits and opens an 
infected file on a new computer. Two known viruses are Chernobyl [Web2] and Jerusalem 
[Web3]. The first viruses were often designed to cause damage on their host computer. In the 
given examples, Chernobyl was designed to erase the entire hard drive of the infected 
computer and Jerusalem erased every program run on Friday 13th.   
 
2.1.1.2.Worms 
“A worm is a self-replicating piece of code that spreads via networks and usually doesn’t 
require human interaction to propagate.” [7] A worm consists of a propagation engine, a 
target selection algorithm, a scanning engine and a payload. Once a host is infected, a target 
selection algorithm is used to determine where to look for new vulnerable hosts. According to 
the chosen target selection, a scanning engine is started to automatically scan the network for 
new victims. The propagation engine consists of exploits for vulnerabilities. The exploits are 
used to be able to install the payload onto hosts. This procedure normally continues without 
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any user interaction. Code Red [Web4] and Nimda [Web5] are examples of two known 
worms. They were both released in 2001. Code Red was reported to infect about 300.000 
hosts in less than 24 hours. Nimda is one of the first worms known to utilize several different 
infecting vectors.   
 
2.1.1.3.Malicious Mobile Code 
“Mobile code is a lightweight program that is downloaded from a remote system and 
executed locally with minimal or no user intervention.” [7] This category includes different 
kinds of scripts, like javascript, Visual Basic script, ActiveX controls and Java applets. These 
types of code are normally presented to the user while surfing the Internet. ActiveX controls 
and Java applets are like small independent software programs. These tools are used to 
enhance the experience surfing the web in different ways. When visiting a web page with 
ActiveX or Java applets enabled, the user is normally presented with a choice to download 
and execute the programs. Like all other software, these controllers may contain hidden 
and/or malicious content.  
 
2.1.1.4.Backdoors 
“A backdoor is a program that allows attackers to bypass normal security controls on a 
system, gaining access on the attacker’s own terms.” [7] By installing a backdoor, an attacker 
is able to gain unauthorized access to a host. Usually administrative privileges are obtained. 
Full access to the infected host is obtained as long as the backdoor is up and running.  
 
2.1.1.5.Trojan Horses  
“A Trojan horse is a program that appears to have some useful or benign purpose, but really 
masks some hidden malicious functionality.” [7] As long as the original intention behind an 
application is hidden, it can be described as a Trojan horse. ICQ is an example of a benign 
instant messaging application. A Trojan horse is typically malicious content hidden behind 
benign looking application names like ICQ. A Trojan horse can contain one or more of the 
characteristics of the other malware categories. From the introduction to chapter 1, one can 
see Trojan horses are prevalent and widely used e.g. in file sharing networks like Kazaa.  
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2.1.1.6.Rootkits 
“RootKits are Trojan horse backdoor tools that modify existing operating system software so 
that an attacker can keep access to and hide on a machine.” [7] Rootkits are collections of 
tools used by attackers. The toolbox may contain backdoors used to obtain unauthorized 
access to a host at any time, utilities to hide the presence of the attacker and tools to gather 
information about the system and its environment. A more detailed description of rootkits will 
be given in section 2.4  
 
2.1.1.7.Combinations 
The different malware categories can be combined in different ways. The payload field of 
worms can be used to distribute viruses, backdoors or rootkits in an automated fashion. As 
already described, rootkis are tools using Trojan horse and backdoor techniques. Even in the 
early days of malware, attackers were able to remotely connect to the infected hosts if 
backdoors were installed. There were, however, no way of using the infected victims as a 
coordinated, distributed platform. In the next section one can see that properties of the classic 
malware categories are combined with a remote command and control channel to give 
attackers access to distributed processing and bandwidth capacity. These networks consisting 
of compromised computers are referred to as botnets.   
 
2.2. Botnets 
Botnets are networks of computers running malicious software, tied together by use of a 
remote command and control channel. Single computers running botnet software are often 
referred to as bots, zombies or drones. Rajab et al. [10] define botnets as “networks of 
infected end-hosts, called bots, that are under the control of a human operator commonly 
known as a botmaster”. Attackers gain control of new hosts using spreading techniques 
commonly known from other forms of malicious code. Worm spreading techniques are 
utilized, like scanning and exploitation of vulnerabilities and distribution of e-mails with 
infected attachments. Distribution via file sharing networks is also common. 
 
2.2.1. Application of use 
To learn more about what botnets are, and what the botmasters use them for, the Honeynet 
Project performed a study on the botnet problem [Web7]. They describe botnets as tools, 
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often used with criminal motives or for destructive purposes. They draw an extensive list of 
applications of use, among others: 
 
- Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks (DDoS) 
- Spamming 
- Sniffing Traffic 
- Keylogging 
- Spreading new malware 
- Installing Advertisement Addons and Browser Helper Objects (BHOs) 
 
During a study, Dagon et al. [13] discovered botnets with sizes ranging from a few hundred 
victims to one with more than 350.000 compromised hosts. Between July 1 and Desember 31, 
2006, Symantec observed more than 6.000.000 distinct bot-infected computers and more than 
60.000 of them were active per day [Web1].  
 
Looking at this information in perspective, it is easy to see how botnets can be used to support 
financial crime. During events like the European soccer championship Euro2004, online 
betting companies have been contacted by attackers who threaten to take down the betting 
sites by flooding them with data if a ransom is not paid [Web8]. Bookmakers were demanded 
to pay £20.000 to £30.000 or face a distributed denial-of-service attack. By controlling 
botnets of sizes found in [13], the threats are very well accomplishable. Other examples of 
making money by the help of botnets may e.g. be to collect credit card numbers by collecting 
data from keyloggers2 installed on the drones. Credit card information can be extracted from 
the recorded log files and sold to criminals. Shady advertising companies may also pay botnet 
owners to target commercials to certain groups of people e.g. by sending spam mail.  
 
Yet another application of use is click fraud. Several advertising companies use strategies for 
displaying advertisements in similar fashion to the Google AdSense service [Web13]. Site 
owners are encouraged to display advertisements from Google on their web pages. In return, 
an amount of money is paid e.g. when the ads are clicked by visitors. Bots like Clickbot.A 
[Web14] take advantage of these services. To prevent fraud, such as site owners clicking ads 
                                                 
2 Keyloggers are applications recording every keystroke made on a compromised host. 
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on their own web pages, the advertising companies use different algorithms to compare 
number of clicks against IP addresses and so on. Botnets can consist of a great number of 
computers all with unique IP addresses. Bots specialized on clicking advertisements can be 
programmed to target the botmasters site. Because several computers with different IP 
addresses are involved, the fraud is difficult to detect. The financial gain of the botmaster can 
be considerable.  
 
Botnets have also currently been seen used by politically motivated groups. Around April 27 a 
massive DDoS attack against Estonian web sites were performed. Access to the web sites of 
Estonia’s prime minister, several banks and schools were effectively blocked for several days. 
Analysis of the malicious traffic shows that computers from the U.S., Canada, Brazil, 
Vietnam and others participated in the attack [Web38].     
 
2.2.2. Remote Control 
The remote command and control channel is the defining characteristic of botnets. Freiling et 
al. [14] summarize the usefulness and necessity of a remote control mechanism controlling 
compromised hosts. Cautious attackers may hard code everything necessary for an attack into 
a malicious file and distribute this file to a number of computers. It will be difficult to trace 
this attack back to a certain person. This would, however, be a method without any flexibility, 
and precise planning in advance of an attack is required. Reverse engineering the code will be 
an effective way of determining what the intentions were and when the actions would take 
place. With a real-time remote command and control channel the attacker is able to specify 
exactly what time an attack shall take place, and which attacks should be performed (DoS, 
spamming, keylogging etc.). Command and control messages are most often sent in a 
broadcast like fashion making each bot perform some action at the very same time. In 
addition, the remote channel may be used to update and upgrade the malware. New 
functionality can be added and weaknesses in the malicious code can be fixed.  
 
2.3. Bot Software  
Barford and Yegenswaran [9] have begun a process of codifying the capabilities of bot 
malware. In their report, they looked at four IRC based botnet code bases. Each code base was 
classified along seven key dimensions; botnet control mechanisms, host control mechanisms, 
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propagation mechanisms, exploits, delivery mechanisms, obfuscation and deception 
mechanisms. In addition, one more mechanism is needed to complete the taxonomy; botnet 
server localization. 
 
- Botnet control refers to the mechanisms used by an attacker to remotely control the 
bots in his/her network.  
- Host control refers to the mechanisms used by the bot software to manipulate the 
victim host once it has been compromised.  
- Propagation refers to the mechanisms used to search for new hosts to infect. 
- Exploits refers to the specific methods for attacking known vulnerabilities on a target 
system. 
- Delivery refers to mechanisms used to get the malicious code into the host.  
- Obfuscation refers to mechanisms used to hide the actual content of what is 
transmitted across a network and what arrives and executes on a host. 
- Deception refers to mechanisms used to avoid detection once the bot is installed on a 
host.  
- Botnet server localization refers to the mechanisms used by bots to determine the 
address of the botmasters command and control server.    
 
These mechanisms can further be placed in one of two main categories; networking- or host 
related. To develop appropriate schemes for detecting malicious software functionality, these 
will represent the main areas to be focused on. Network-based detection of ill intentioned 
activity is most likely best observed from other computers than the victim itself. Some 
malware have the ability to manipulate results displayed to a user on a local computer. This 
category is called rootkits, and is explored in section 2.4. Network related aspects are 
therefore interesting to observe from a known clean host. Running processes, API calls and so 
on can, however, only be observed and detected from the victim itself.   
 
In the networking category the botnet control, propagation, exploit, delivery, obfuscation and 
botnet server localization mechanisms will be studied. The characteristics defined in each of 
these groups will be deciding when setting up detection procedures for finding network 
related aspects. Likewise, the host control, obfuscation and deception mechanisms will 
determine what to look for on the host itself. 
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Obfuscation is located in both categories because, as mentioned earlier, the term refers to both 
mechanisms to avoid network-based and host-based detection.   
 
2.3.1. Host Related Properties 
The descriptions of host related properties give an introduction to what happens inside the 
host operating system when installing bot applications. 
 
2.3.1.1. Host Control Mechanisms  
A bot is of no use to an attacker if it is not available. Anti-virus software may discover and 
disable the threat; if not at once, maybe after updating anti-virus signature files. There is also 
a risk of other malware specimens taking over the system. E.g. observations of two Internet 
worms competing for the control of a host have been observed [Web9]. Included in the term 
host control are mechanisms for discovering and disabling anti-virus systems, and eliminating 
existing vulnerabilities exploitable by other malicious components.  
 
Several other characteristics also fall under the term host control. Bots needs to be activated 
every time a computer is rebooted. Thus, mechanisms to start automatically are utilized. 
Entries in files, registry or folders with auto-starting properties are required. These entries are 
normally inserted at time of installation. Further, bots are designed to perform tasks 
commanded by the botmaster. Interaction with the host operating system is necessary to be 
able to perform tasks like key stroke logging, reading information from registry entries or to 
list and start or stop processes. All of these characteristics have been found when analyzing 
existing bot source code [9]. 
 
2.3.1.2.Obfuscation 
Obfuscation refers to techniques used to preserve the program’s semantics and functionality 
while, at the same time, making it more difficult for the analyst to extract and comprehend the 
program’s structures [15]. Obfuscation in a host-based setting are connected to techniques 
used by malware authors most often used to evade detection by anti-virus software and to 
make a human analysis more difficult. There are some techniques used by the malware 
community to achieve obfuscation that are more prevalent than others. These are packing, 
polymorphism and metamorphism.  
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Packers are applications originally used to reduce the size of executable applications. Using a 
packer on a malware specimen results in changes to the malicious file, which may lead to 
problems for the anti-virus software’s signature based detection schemes. The majority of 
packers combine the compressed executable with the decompression code into a single file. 
When the packed file is run, the content is decompressed and run from memory. Anti-virus 
companies provide signatures of known malware packers to help detecting suspicious packed 
programs.  
 
Polymorphism is an obfuscation technique commonly known from a number of self-
replicating worms. The malware is designed to encrypt/decrypt itself with different encryption 
algorithms and keys every time it is copied or replicated. Some are also able to generate 
multiple encryption layers. A signature-based detection can only be performed on the 
decrypted malware body, which will be constant throughout its life [16]. 
 
Metamorphism takes the obfuscation one step further. It is a techniques used to change the 
full code of the malicious application every time it is replicated. Included in metamorphism 
are register renaming, code permutation, code expansion, code shrinking and dead code 
insertion [17]. In contrast to polymorphic malware which always is decoded to the same code, 
metamorphic malware bodies are constantly changing thus making detection extremely 
difficult. The metamorphic code mutation of the malicious content is performed in such a way 
that the functionality always remains the same. 
 
2.3.1.3.Deception 
Deception mechanisms may be used to avoid detection once the bot is installed on a host. 
Examples of such mechanisms observed in real life bots are: tests for debuggers, test for 
VMware, killing anti-virus processes and altering DNS entries of anti-virus software 
companies to point to localhost [9]. Hiding files and processes are also commonly used 
techniques [3]. The more professional the botnet owners are the more advanced methods are 
used. Virtual environments and software debuggers are often used when analyzing malicious 
code, thus mechanisms to complicate the analysis are implemented by malware authors. 
Killing anti-virus processes and keeping the malicious running processes hidden are also 
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essential to remain undetected on a computer. The deception techniques used are adapted 
from rootkits, further discussed in section 2.4. 
 
2.3.2. Network Related Properties    
The descriptions of network-based properties give an introduction to how bot applications 
behave, seen from a network perspective. The activities described in this section are 
observable from computers remote from the infected hosts.  
  
2.3.2.1.Botnet Control Mechanisms 
As mentioned earlier, the defining characteristic of botnets is the inclusion of a remote 
command and control capability. A bot is controlled by a botmaster via a communication 
channel. The communication may be realized using different protocols. IRC, HTTP and P2P 
protocols are commonly used, although botnets using the IRC channels are the most prevalent 
[9, 10] [Web10].  
 
It should be possible to roughly classify the type of bot by studying network activity. Taking 
IRC based bots as an example; network traffic containing words like “TOPIC”, “PRIVMSG” 
or “NOTICE” indicate the presence of an IRC based bot [Web7]. These are all messages 
defined by the IRC standard [18].  
 
In addition to the set of messages defined by the communication standard used, control 
messages proprietary to the specified bot may be added. Modules and commands for 
execution of DoS attacks, spamming and so on are not part of any recognized standards. As a 
consequence these messages will most likely be different depending on the bot developer. 
Accordingly these messages can be used to categorize which family a bot application belongs 
to [9].   
 
Automated tools can be used to detect the presence of especially IRC based botnets. As a 
consequence, some malware authors choose to design their own proprietary communication 
protocols. Without network administrators knowing what to look for, the risk of being caught 
is smaller using proprietary vs. standard communication protocols.  
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2.3.2.2.Delivery, Propagation and Exploit 
Rajab et al [10] found that bots use several different techniques to recruit new hosts to the 
botnet. E-mails with Trojan attachments, mobile malicious code distributed on the web and 
active scanning to exploit vulnerable services are mechanisms used. Also Trojan applications 
downloadable from distribution sites or P2P networks [3] are possible delivery mechanisms. 
Scanning and exploiting vulnerabilities is the most prevalent spreading mechanism.  
 
Bots using scanning to spread can be grouped in two [10]. Section 2.1.1.2 gave an 
introduction to how worms spread on the Internet. The first group have inherited properties 
from the worms. Once installed on a host, the bot continuously scan certain ports based on its 
target selection algorithm and scanning engine. Vulnerable hosts found will be infected. The 
second group of bots have a variable scanning behaviour. They are equipped with a number of 
scanning algorithms. The botmaster uses the command and control channel to determine when 
a scan will start and which algorithm to use. 
 
The scanning engine is normally designed to search for certain vulnerabilities. In the 
automated bot-code delivery process, exploits for these vulnerabilities are embedded in the 
bot. It is impossible to know which vulnerabilities are taken advantage of. New exploits are 
designed whenever new vulnerabilities are found. Bots are often developed with a modular 
approach, in this case meaning that new exploits can be added whenever a new exploit-
module is available. A few of common existing exploits are listed belowe: 
 
- Exploit backdoors left by the Bagle worm on port 2745 
- Exploit backdoors left by the MyDoom worm on port 3127 
- Exploit Microsoft-DS Service, used for resource sharing on Windows machines, on port 
445/TCP 
- Exploit NetBIOS Session Service, used for resource sharing on Windows machines, on 
port 139/TCP 
- Exploit Microsoft RPC service, port 135/TCP 
 
2.3.2.3.Obfuscation 
Firewalls and intrusion detection systems are utilities constantly looking for suspicious 
network activity. A bot failing to pass firewall rules will be unable to communicate with the 
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botmaster and is useless to the attacker. Traffic matching IDS signatures will be logged and 
set off alarms. A vigilant system manager will detect and disable the bot causing alarms. To 
be able to stay undetected on computers, some bots use different techniques to obfuscate the 
network traffic. 
 
Encryption, steganography and utilization of unused communication protocol header fields 
are among the techniques used to obfuscate network traffic. These topics fall under the term 
covert traffic channels and are further explored in chapter 2.4.2 . 
 
2.3.2.4.Botnet Server Localization 
Computers newly infected with bot software somehow need to locate and connect to their 
botmaster’s network of compromised machines. If a bot fails to contact to its belonging 
command and control server it will not be part of the botnet and thus useless to its botmaster. 
A white paper from Trend Micro [Web10] describes three different methods used by bots to 
find their home servers. These are hard-coding of IP addresses, use of dynamic DNS services 
and use of distributed DNS services.  
 
The use of hard-coded IP addresses and references to static DNS services are in retreat. By 
shutting down a command and control server which is located by use of static pointers, the 
whole botnet will be brought down. Bots with static addresses hard coded, will not be able to 
update and discover new command and control centres. Botmasters using these techniques run 
a great risk of loosing their entire botnet by the fact that static addresses are easily located and 
the C&C server shut down.  
 
In stead of using the above mentioned techniques, dynamic DNS services are often used. DNS 
names offered by dynamic DNS providers, like No-IP.com [Web11] or DynDNS [Web12], 
are hard-coded into the bot binary. If a command and control server is shut down, a new 
server can be created and the dynamic DNS entry of the provider can be update with the IP 
address of the newly established server. When the bot no longer can communicate with their 
home server, DNS queries are made, and the IP address of the new C&C server is returned. 
 
The third method is for botnets to run their own distributed DNS services. The bot binary 
contains the IP addresses of these name servers. The address of the C&C server is resolved by 
contacting the distributed domain name server. These servers are out of the reach of 
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authorities and as a consequence botnets using this mechanism is harder to detect and take 
down. In addition high port numbers are used to try to evade firewalls and intrusion detection 
systems. 
 
2.3.3. Bots vs. classic malware 
The botnet problem is relatively recent. In the early ages of Internet, most attackers wrote 
viruses designed to delete files, erase hard drives or perform some other destructive acts. 
Computers were hacked, often to brag about how many computers were exposed or how 
difficult it was to break in. There were no means of coordinating the compromised machines 
using them as distributed computing platforms.  
 
From section 2.2 on botnets and 2.3 describing bot code characteristics, one can see the 
similarities and differences between bots and other malware specimens. To summarize; bots 
constitute the evolution of classical malware. From worms the ability to self-replicate across 
networks are adopted. Backdoors are added to give attackers access to compromised hosts. 
Trojan horse techniques are used to trick people into downloading bot code from peer-to-peer 
networks and to make the bot’s running processes and registry keys look like benign 
elements. More recent, bots are also adapting techniques known from rootkits to be able to 
hide and remain undetected on computers for a longer period of time [3]. 
 
The main difference between bots and the other malware categories is the attacker’s ability to 
coordinate compromised hosts via a remote command and control channel. Backdoors also 
provide access to remote computers via command and control channels. Pure backdoors 
however, do not allow coordinated operation of several victims at the same time. With bots, 
each infected host will be part of a larger network, namely botnets, where e.g. one single 
command directed to the entire network can lead to an instant distributed denial-of-sevice 
attack. Earlier an attacker would have to log into each backdoor-infected machine 
sequentially, instructing them to start an attack at a specified date and time, to accomplish the 
same. 
 
In the next section, rootkit technology is presented. Deception mechanisms to hide the 
presence of bots become more and more common. In the future, it will be even more 
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important for bot owners to utilize stealth techniques to remain undetected on compromised 
hosts, as the detection mechanisms become more advanced. 
 
2.4. Rootkit Technology 
The term rootkit originates from the Linux environment. The most powerful user with full 
system privileges on a Linux system is called root. A rootkit is a toolkit running with full 
privileges on a computer. Section 2.1.1.6 defined rootkits to be a collection of several 
different tools. Some tools are used by attackers to gain remote unauthorized access to 
compromised computers. Other tools hide the presence of the attacker and the rootkit files. 
There are also rootkits containing utilities collecting sensitive information like usernames, 
passwords, credit card numbers and the like. Rootkits are often used to hide the presence of 
other malicious files or processes.  
 
Some people argue that rootkits are not inherently malicious [11]. Law enforcement may 
legally, based on e.g. court orders, use rootkit technology for tapping computers or computer 
networks. Sony BMG’s attempt to prevent piracy of music [Web16] is another example of 
rootkit technology usage without malicious intentions. However, headlines were created when 
the public found out, and the “benign” Sony rootkits were exploited by hackers [19]. Even 
though there are examples of benign use of rootkits, the great majority of users of this 
technology wear black hats. 
 
The most important keyword describing rootkits is stealth. The whole idea behind rootkits is 
to provide a practically undetectable playground for attackers on their compromised hosts. 
Normally, anomalies in lists of running processes, opened communication ports, new 
unknown registry settings and the like, should make a vigilant system administrator do further 
investigations. The most common way for attackers to prevent detection, besides rootkits, is 
to use Trojan techniques giving processes, registry keys and so on benign looking names. 
These elements are nevertheless detectable, and rootkis are the attackers’ response to 
administrators on the alert. By manipulating responses returned by applications or operating 
system kernels, attackers can prevent certain information from ever being presented to the 
user. There are two main categories of rootkits: user-mode and kernel-mode. 
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2.4.1. Rootkits – Host Manipulation 
The following section describes the main principles used by rootkit authors to control 
compromised computers and to provide stealth. The descriptions refer to techniques utilized 
on the Microsoft Windows platform. It is not considered whether the same techniques apply 
to other operating systems. 
  
2.4.1.1.User-Mode Rootkits 
User-mode rootkits are the more primitive of the two categories. The first user-mode rootkits 
were Trojan versions of known applications. Netstat is a tool displaying open communication 
ports on a system. A Trojan version of this application could prevent open ports belonging to 
the rootkit from being displayed. Likewise, file-listing applications can be configured not to 
display files belonging to or hidden by the rootkit.  
 
Another user-mode approach is to replace existing libraries with wrappers. Wrappers contain 
the same API functions as the original libraries, but also include filters set by the attacker. 
Hoglund and Butler [11] use the term hooking for this functionality. Each library contains 
tables of how each API function it offers can be contacted by external libraries en 
executables. Rootkits identify these tables and modify them to point API function calls to 
their own malicious libraries. When an application performs an API call, the request is 
directed to the Trojan library which redirects it to the original library. Necessary system calls 
are made and data processed. The Trojan library filters data returned by the original library 
and modified information is displayed to the user [20]. Figure 3 illustrates this process. 
 
 
Figure 3: Illustration of user-mode rootkit operation. Illustration adapted from [20]. 
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The first Trojan user-mode rootkits have one severe weakness. To be able to hide files, 
folders, processes, registry keys and every other aspect manipulated by the malware, all 
applications able to report anything from these elements have to be controlled. In the netstat 
example, where open ports are listed, one would also need to control third party tools like the 
popular port listing utilities fport [Web49] and TCPView [Web50] to be able to hide 
perfectly. Compromised systems running Trojan versions of netstat and third party tools not 
controlled by the attacker can easily be discovered by comparing results from the different 
applications. A result displayed in one application, but not in another, should call a system 
manager’s attention.  
 
Using Trojan libraries improves this situation. Attackers will need to identify which library 
calls popular applications make, and insert Trojan libraries handling these calls. Several 
applications probably use the same techniques to retrieve information from the operating 
system, thus it is easier to control a limited amount of libraries than every existing application. 
One can hardly be certain every possible API-call is covered. Comparing results from 
applications using different techniques to retrieve information could be a source of 
discovering user-mode rootkits using both application manipulation and library manipulation. 
 
2.4.1.2. Kernel-Mode Rootkits 
The second category of rootkits is called kernel-mode rootkits. These are the underground 
community’s response to user-mode rootkits’ weaknesses. By manipulating the operating 
system kernel one can control close to every aspect of a computer. 
 
In order to allow flexibility, MS Windows is designed with a layered driver architecture. 
Hardware devices in a computer are dependant on a set of drivers to function properly 
together. Whenever access to a device is requested, the request is passed down a stack of 
drivers. This allows each driver to handle a limited number of tasks. To be able to add and 
remove functionality at a later stage, Windows drivers are built with a modular approach. 
New drivers can be added to support new functionality.  
 
Several drivers are involved e.g. when displaying information to the screen. A user requests 
information by typing on his keyboard. The keyboard driver is called and passes the request to 
the next driver in the chain, which might be the file system driver. If the requested 
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information on the file system is encrypted, an encryption driver might be called before 
passing the information on to the display driver. Finally, the wanted information is displayed 
on the screen.  
 
Regular software is not allowed to communicate directly with the operating system kernel. 
Access to the kernel is gained by rootkit authors by writing drivers accessible by user 
applications. A driver typically operates in the kernel space of the OS. Because of the 
modularity of the driver structure, attackers can utilize malicious drivers to intercept regular 
data flows in the kernel. By hooking an ill-intentioned driver into the regular data flow 
between drivers, an attacker can by far manipulate every operation made on a computer.  
 
The insertion of a malicious driver can be utilized in much the same way as a user-mode 
Trojan library. The ill-natured driver can reprogram function tables in the kernel in such a 
way that every interesting event is processed by the rootkit code. Controlling the information 
flow to and from the kernel means full control of the computer. Keyloggers can be made from 
drivers hooked into the keyboard driver; files can be hidden by programming filters in drivers 
hooked into the file system driver and so on. Hoglund and Butler [11] also mention the 
possibility of creating audio bugs, webcam controllers and the like by utilizing these 
techniques. 
 
A second method, besides the driver insertion, used to create kernel-mode rootkits is first 
presented by Butler [11] and called Direct Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM). Information 
on running processes, loaded device drivers and open ports is accounted for in structured 
objects running in memory. Objects running in memory can be altered directly. It is not 
necessary to hook API calls and filter results, which was the case for user-mode rootkits and 
kernel-mode rootkits using driver insertion. 
 
A structure called EPROCESS contains doubly linked lists of all active processes currently 
running in the Windows operating system. Each object in the structure contains links to the 
objects in front of, and behind itself. Windows Task Manager, among other tools, uses this 
information when listing all running processes. The object structure is traversed by following 
the pointers to the next object. To hide processes, the DKOM technique takes advantage of 
this and manipulates objects in the EPROCESS structure. Object links pointing to rootkit 
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processes can be altered to ignore the malicious process and point to the next benign process. 
Figure 4 illustrates this situation.  
 
 
Figure 4: Doubly linked structures keep track of running processes. The red process is 
un-linked from the structure using DKOM techniques. 
 
The topmost illustration represents the doubly linked list used by Windows to keep track of 
running processes. The illustration below shows the same list manipulated to hide a rootkit 
process using DKOM techniques. 
 
Information of every running process, including the hidden once, is kept elsewhere in the 
operating system kernel. Unlinking objects from the EPROCESS structure does not affect the 
CPU time acquired by the malicious process.  
 
In similar ways as hiding processes, DKOM can be used for hiding loaded device drivers and 
open ports. These elements are stored in structures like EPROCESS, and can be manipulated 
using the same principles.  
 
In addition to contain information about neighbour elements, other useful information is 
stored using the mentioned data structures. Among other attributes, information of which 
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privileges a process runs with, ant the like, is stored. An attacker in position to manipulate 
pointers to other elements is also capable of elevating system privileges using DKOM.   
 
While user-mode rootkits could be discovered by comparing results from several utilities 
using different techniques in retrieving information, kernel-mode rootkits control the system 
on such a low level that the same detection techniques will most probably not apply. Rootkits 
control the data flow to and from the kernel in such a way that the integrity of any data, even 
analysis results from malware detection tools, can not be trusted. In the end, who wins the 
battle is a matter of who controls the kernel first. 
 
2.4.2. Rootkits – Covert Traffic Channels 
Clever attackers do everything they can to remain undetected on a system. Botnets, for 
instance, are dependant on the command and control channel. Network activity related to 
communication between a zombie and a botnet server is vulnerable to detection. Network 
monitors like IDS solutions are often used both on corporate networks and personal 
computers, and administrators guarding their systems can easily notice anomalies in network 
activity. To remain undetected on a network, stealth technology can also be applied to the 
communication channels. Regarding botnets, it is hard to imagine that a DoS attack can be 
performed undetected from a supervised system due to the amounts of data being transmitted 
at time of the attack. Remote control commands, transfer of sensitive data like password files, 
logs containing keystrokes and other user activities are, however, very well possible to 
transmit using stealthy approaches. 
 
Hoglund and Butler [11] cover some topics of covert channels in their book on rootkits. The 
key aspect for those designing covert channels is to implement a communication path that 
breaks through firewalls undetected by intrusion detection systems or other network sniffers. 
These channels are often created using some form of extensions to existing communication 
protocols and are specifically designed to move hidden data. 
 
If a covert channel is detected and monitored, it is unlikely to find any clear text data. 
Encryption and steganography are techniques used to obfuscate data being transmitted. In [11] 
an illustration of how DNS queries can be used to generate covert channels is given. The 
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illustration is copied in Figure 5. The DNS service is essential in the operation of most 
networks, hence DNS traffic is normally allowed through firewalls. In addition, the DNS 
protocol uses UDP packets which minimize traffic overhead. TCP uses a three way handshake 
to establish connections, while UDP does not. It is also possible to spoof the source address of 
UDP packets.  
 
  
Figure 5: A series of DNS requests used to encode an acrostic message. The first letter of 
each DNS name is used to reconstruct the message “SECRET” [11].  
 
Figure 5 illustrates how steganographic principles are used in combination with DNS queries 
to create a communication channel transmitting data in a hidden fashion. Using the principles 
shown in the figure above, several key properties of a covert channel can be accomplished: 
  
- Firewall evasion is made by using the DNS protocol (UDP port 53) for outbound 
connections.  
- The transmitted message is obfuscated using steganography, thus more difficult to detect. 
- A random time interval can be used between each packet, avoiding a peak in network 
activity. 
TCP/IP 
Header 
TCP/IP 
Header 
TCP/IP 
Header 
TCP/IP 
Header 
TCP/IP 
Header 
TCP/IP 
Header 
DNS 
Header 
TCP/IP 
Header 
TCP/IP 
Header 
TCP/IP 
Header 
TCP/IP 
Header 
TCP/IP 
Header 
Query for: 
sales.google.com 
Query for: 
estate.google.com 
Query for: 
cars.google.com 
Query for: 
railway.google.com 
Query for: 
electric.google.com 
Query for: 
trunkey.google.com 
S E C R TE
Detection of Malicious Software Functionality  
 
     
 
30
 
In addition to the steganographic principle used above, a second layer of protection can be 
added. By encrypting the message before it is transmitted it will be even more difficult to 
detect the communication channel. An illustration of this can be given by use of the simple 
Caesar cipher: 
 
Plaintext: A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z 
Cipher text:  D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C  
 
The key in this example cipher is 3, meaning the alphabet is offset three letters to the left 
between the plaintext and the cipher text. The encryption is done by substituting a plaintext 
letter with the corresponding cipher text letter. 
 
“SECRET” would be encrypted to “VHFUHW”. A vigilant system manager being able to 
discover a system in the executive messages in the first example would have more trouble 
discovering relations between the following DNS queries: 
 
- virginia.website.com 
- houston.website.com 
- florida.website.com 
- utah.website.com 
- hawaii.website.com 
- washington.website.com 
 
The examples given so far are illustrations of covert channels implemented in payload fields 
of data packets. There are several examples of hidden channels carrying data in protocol 
header fields. HTTP headers [21], TCP headers [22, 23], IP headers [23] and ICMP packets 
[Web15], among others, can all be carriers of malicious network traffic. Attackers take 
advantage header fields with optional use or fields not used at all to remain undetected. These 
are normally not inspected by firewalls or IDSs, thus these packets pass unnoticed through 
the network.  
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There are even descriptions of covert traffic channels utilizing lower layer protocols [24] and 
timing between received packets [25] to establish communication. These channels do not 
send any bits or bytes in the data packet itself. Rather sophisticated methods are implemented 
to influence and interpret the behaviour of e.g. packet collisions in the MAC protocol or 
timing and order of received IP packets. 
 
2.5. Malware Detection 
So far characteristics of malware are presented with a special focus on botnets and rootkits. 
This section will introduce different theories, which can be used to determine how and where 
to look for malicious content in general, through behavioural analysis. The section is summed 
up by looking at how each detection theory can be used to find properties specific to bots and 
rootkits. 
 
Most traditional anti-virus systems use signature-based detection, meaning that code 
introduced to the computer is scanned for characteristic byte sequences. Malware instances 
can be recognized by looking for unique patterns in the code. This method proved to be 
effective in the beginning of the battle between malware writers and anti-virus vendors. The 
major drawback to this technique is the absence of ability to detect new, unknown malicious 
code. When new instances3 of malicious software are found, new signature files have to be 
written and distributed to the detection tools. As a consequence there is always a window of 
vulnerability between the release of a new ill-natured code sequence and the release and full 
update of signature databases.  
 
As traditional malware detection techniques has become better and better, virus writers has 
twisted their minds to come up with new and improved ways for their code to escape 
detection. The signature-based detection techniques proved to be effective in discovering 
known malware specimens. To extend the lifetime of their code, malware writers started using 
polymorphic and metamorphic techniques. Each time the malicious code is replicated a 
mutation of its code takes place. As a consequence, a new signature-file has to be written for 
                                                 
3 A new instance can either be a mutation of an existing malware specimen, a new malware specimen or 
malware utilizing zero-day attacks.   
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each mutation to be able to detect the mutated specimen. With close to infinite permutations, 
ill-natured code can prolong its active life considerably.  
 
Limitations in the signature-based detection techniques force the malware fighters to 
implement new and improved methods in the combat. Behavioural analysis is proposed as a 
complement to signature-based detection techniques. The following sections will introduce 
some of the research made on the topics of behavioural malware analysis. 
 
2.5.1. Host-Based Detection 
This section presents techniques that can be utilized to observe changes in the host operating 
system, during or immediately after installation of an application. 
 
2.5.1.1.Auto-Start Extensibility Points  
To complement signature-based tools in the malware detection process, Wang et al [26] 
suggest complementing the traditional approaches with a concept they refer to as Auto-Start 
Extensibility Points. In [26] a focus on the spyware category is presented, but the techniques 
introduced will apply to several other malicious software categories as well. Wang et al state 
that: “an overwhelming majority of all spyware programs infect a system in such a way that 
they are automatically started upon reboot and the launch of most commonly used 
applications”. 
 
Auto-Start Extensibility Points are application extensibility points offered by the operating 
system, which can be utilized by applications to ensure they are automatically started after 
every reboot of a computer. The ability to start automatically after a reboot is crucial to close 
to all malware categories. It would be almost impossible to build botnets if the code did not 
survive a reboot. Worms would be far less efficient, and why bother to establish a backdoor if 
it was not possible to reconnect to a compromised computer the next day? Software using the 
auto-start extensibility points are distinguished by two categories [26]:  
 
1. Standalone applications that is automatically run by registering as an OS auto-start 
extension, such as a Windows NT service 
Master’s Thesis 
     33
2. Extensions to existing applications that is automatically run, or extensions to popular 
applications commonly run by users, like web browsers 
 
The solution presented by Wang et al is to monitor the auto-start extensibility points to 
determine if unauthorized code is run during start-up. Typical places to look for auto-starting 
code is in registry settings where certain registry keys are dedicated to auto-starting 
applications and where e.g. Internet Explorer toolbars are registered. Also start-up folders and 
drivers have to be monitored. 
 
The technique proved to be efficient in discovering spyware, but the method did have some 
limitations. Among others, rootkits hide their presence in such a way that other detection 
techniques are necessary, and the malware can use undocumented methods to start 
automatically. 
 
2.5.1.2.Cross-View Diff 
Wang et al [27] introduce a concept called cross-view diff to detect stealth software. As 
described in section 2.4, user-mode rootkits utilize techniques to intercept OS-provided APIs. 
Queries initialized by the user are filtered to hide certain files, registry settings or running 
processes. The idea behind the cross-view diff approach is, for instance, that queries listing 
every file on a hard-drive can be made on different levels.  
 
A high-level approach will typically use the OS-provided API to list the points of interest. 
These results can be compared to a low-level scan of the computer. A low-level scan will 
typically be initialized from within the OS-kernel e.g. by use of drivers. While user-mode 
rootkits most probably will be able to manipulate results from the high-level scan, they are not 
likely able to affect the low-level scan results, thus deviations in the scan results indicate 
some suspicious presence. 
 
The authors of [27] argue that cross-view diff can be used to detect hidden files, hidden 
registry keys and hidden processes. There are however some limitations. As mentioned, the 
method is only fit when trying to detect malware utilizing hiding techniques similar to ones 
found in user-mode rootkits. As explained in section 2.4.1.2 kernel-mode rootkits operate 
inside the kernel. One can never trust results returned from a kernel already infected with this 
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type of malware. Since the malicious code is able to affect both the low- and high-level scans, 
a positive detection can prove difficult.        
 
2.5.1.3.Cross-Time Diff 
Cross-time diff is also a term introduced in [27] (2004) although the concept is presented 
earlier e.g. by Kim and Spafford in [28] (1994). Cross-time diff aims at comparing the state of 
a running system with a previous snapshot of the same system. Essentially, snapshots from 
two different points in time are compared as opposed to cross-view diff, which compares two 
different points of view at the same time. 
 
File integrity checkers like Tripwire [28] are examples of cross-time diff applications. These 
tools came as a response to the first user-mode rootkits, which consisted of Trojan versions of 
known Unix applications like ps4, ls5 and netstat6. An integrity checker can scan a computer 
for files, registry settings and the like and store a snapshot of the current state in the form of 
message digests of each file and setting. At a later time, the integrity checker can be run once 
again. Changes in known operating system files or important registry settings can indicate the 
presence of Trojan horses or other malicious code. By doing a complete integrity check of an 
entire hard-drive, the tool can be used to determine which files were installed and other 
changes made by a newly introduced application. 
 
Szor [6] illustrate some problems using integrity checkers alone to detect malicious 
components. False positives can be created by applications changing their own code. 
Configuration information is sometimes stored in the executable itself, thus the integrity 
checksums may differ for each scan. Packers can be used to save disc space and security 
updates may introduce new operating system files and changes to existing once. The major 
problem with integrity checkers as stand-alone malware scanners though, is the lack of ability 
to detect malicious code running in memory and the ability to detect malicious objects hidden 
with rootkit technology.  
 
                                                 
4 ps is a utility listing all running processes  
5 ls is used to list the files in an archive 
6 Netstat is used to display information like open communication port and network statistics 
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Integrity scanners are dependant of objects to analyze. The first user-mode rootkits could be 
detected as they introduced changes to existing operating system files as mentioned above. 
With new generations of rootkits, the existing operating system files are intact. Rootkits 
manipulate the information flow between users and objects. A file request from an integrity 
checker will be forwarded by the rootkit code to the original files. Since the original files are 
intact, they will be declared clean. Cross-time diff techniques will always suffer from these 
drawbacks. However, combining integrity checking with other detection methods will 
increase the chances of detecting malicious activity [6]. 
 
2.5.1.4. Event Monitoring 
Moffie et al [29] suggest complementing traditional signature-based malware detection 
techniques with an analysis of data flow and control flow information collected during  the 
execution of a binary.  There are numerous events that need to be monitored. In [29] looking 
at system calls, library calls and properties like file and process creation is proposed. System 
call traces may also be used by intrusion detection systems to monitor malicious activity [30]. 
 
System calls are the mechanism used to pass information between an application and the 
operating system. In other words, to communicate with the OS kernel, applications utilize 
system calls. Read and write operations to the file system and initiation of network 
connections are examples of functions depending on an information flow between 
applications and the kernel. Library calls are the mechanisms used by applications to request 
services from other applications or libraries. 
 
To be able to detect malicious processes resident in memory, the memory needs to be scanned 
[6]. Some malware only run as processes in memory and do not interact with the file system. 
Such processes can be detected either in user-mode or kernel-mode. The same problem is 
faced here as in other detection techniques. Rootkit technology can be used to hide processes. 
Kernel-mode scanning may help detect user-mode rootkits. Kernel-mode rootkits, however, 
may even manipulate kernel-mode scanning results and thus prove difficult to detect.  
 
Monitoring the above mentioned properties will give detailed information during the 
installation process. Among other aspects, it will be possible to determine which files were 
created, which processes were started and where and what information was collected by the 
malware during installation. It will also be possible to determine if network connections was 
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established. One can be able to decide whether or not certain behaviour belongs to malicious 
processes based on the collected data.   
 
 
2.5.1.5. Dead or live analysis techniques 
Carrier [20] describes the problem of live vs. dead analysis of digital systems. A live analysis 
uses software running on the compromised operating system during the analysis process. A 
dead analysis, however, refer to an analysis of a system while the compromised operating 
system is powered off. A trusted OS and trusted applications are used to investigate the 
content of the target disk drive.  
 
Remembering how rootkits interfere with library calls, system calls and even data flows 
inside the kernel, it is easy to see the limitations of live analysis techniques. There is always a 
risk of data being manipulated and filtered as long as the rootkit is active. During a dead 
analysis the infected operating system is inactive, thus the elements hiding the malicious 
content is also inactive.  
 
Even though these thoughts seem promising in detecting rootkits, they will not be further 
explored in this report. They are mentioned here to illustrate that there are other discovery 
methods than the ones presented above. 
 
2.5.2. Network-Based Detection 
Network-based detection refers to techniques used to discover the presence of malicious 
entities by studying properties related to network activity. As presented in section 1.5, 
network-based detection of malicious activity was studied during the project assignment of 
fall 2006 [12]. To complete this report, some of the topics presented in [12] are repeated. The 
topics of access control records and honeypots, below, were not included in the fall 
assignment. 
 
2.5.2.1. Access Control Records 
Router Access List is proposed by Szor [6], among others, as a defensive strategy used to 
protect networks. The idea is to update routers with records of hosts or network segments of 
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which are allowed or denied access to network resources. Data packets from intruders may 
simply not be routed in the network because of the policies defined in the access lists.  
 
Briefly mentioned in section 2.4.2 the source address of UDP packets can be spoofed. 
Address spoofing is e.g. used by some malware specimens to complicate the task of 
determining which host is infected on a network. In a behavioural analysis scenario, access 
control records can be utilized to help detect usage of address spoofing. Network traffic from 
hosts that should not send any traffic or from addresses not allocated to any hosts, can be 
caught and logged based on the access control records.   
 
2.5.2.2. Intrusion Detection Systems 
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) are utilities used to inspect both network flow and the 
content of each packet sent on a network. Network intrusion detection systems, NIDS, are 
designed to sniff packets off the wire and based on certain rules, decide whether the network 
traffic is malicious or not. This can be done either via a signature-based approach or an 
anomaly-based approach.  
 
The signature-based approach can be compared to traditional anti-virus detection 
mechanisms. Network activity is compared to a list of predefined signatures based on 
unauthorized communication protocols, known attack patterns, known malicious payload 
content and the like. Anomaly-based detection will try to determine the presence of malicious 
processes e.g. by studying the amount of network traffic compared to time of day, or 
abnormal traffic flow patterns. The assumption is that the network behaviour of an attacker or 
malicious process is noticeably different from that of a legitimate user.   
 
Mukherjee et al [31] suggest using IDSs to detect the presence of malware or intruders on a 
network. Backdoors can be detected by discovering traffic flows to and from e.g. 
unauthorized communication ports, and payload fields can be scanned for messages 
characteristic to e.g. IRC bots [10] [Web7]. Scanning patterns and replication of worms are 
also possible to detect. Polymorphic worms have proved to make IDS-based detection more 
difficult, but recent research has demonstrated that even such obfuscation techniques are 
possible to handle [32].  
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Intrusion detection systems are great tools for detecting unwanted traffic on a network. They 
may, however, be difficult to tune in such a way that administrators are not flooded with false 
alerts on malicious activity or even more problematic, not alerted of serious incidents at all. 
This is the major drawback to these systems.   
 
2.5.2.3. Honeypots 
Spitzner is one of the leaders of the honeypot development, and a lot of his work and concepts 
of honeypots are published in his book [8]. Honeypot theory can also be studied in [33]. 
Spitzner’s definition of a honeypot is: “A honeypot is security resource whose value lies in 
being probed, attacked, or compromised.” A honeypot is a system intentionally left with 
minimal inbound security and a more firmly defined outbound policy. By letting attackers, 
either manually or automatically (worm propagation), gain access to honeypot systems, one 
can observe the activity and learn more about current Internet threats. Honeypots have no 
production value, and no person or resource should be communicating with them. As a 
consequence one can argue that most traffic to and from the system is a result of malicious 
activity. 
 
Honeypots can be used in production environments to help raising alerts of unauthorized 
activity on the network and to slow down worms. They can also be used as research resources 
to study present threats. Honeypots are categorized in three different interaction levels; low-
interaction, medium-interaction and high-interaction.  
 
Low-interaction honeypots typically emulate a limited set of services, e.g. telnet or ftp. As 
there are no real services to log on to, connection attempts will be rejected each time. Each 
attempt to connect to the honeypot is logged, and will give valuable information like which 
services are tried exploited, which hosts initiated the attack and the like. 
 
Medium-interaction honeypots offer more fully implemented services. Instead of rejecting 
each connection attempt, a medium-interaction telnet service, for instance, could allow the 
attacker to log in, list and copy files and so on. The service is still emulated so the attacker is 
not able to interact with the real operating system. Such systems will return more information 
about malicious activity than the low-interaction system, but at a price of more complexity.   
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High-interaction honeypots give attackers access to real operating systems. The attacker is 
free to play around on the compromised system. By studying the activity one can learn how 
attackers break into systems, what they look for on compromised hosts, which utilities they 
install and the like. If not properly controlled, a high-interaction honeypot can even be an 
active player in attacks towards other systems. To prevent this, an interesting set of tools has 
been developed. 
 
Honeypot concepts are interesting and may also prove to be useful in behavioural analysis of 
malicious applications.  
 
2.5.2.4.Remote Vulnerability Checking 
Malware enabled to communicate with its environment utilizes different techniques to 
establish the communication. Some ill-natured code initiates every connection from within the 
host, while others establish listening ports waiting for an attacker to establish the session. 
Skaggs et al [34] suggests using remote vulnerability scanners to detect the presence of 
malware on a host.  
 
Remote port scanners can be used to determine which ports are set in listening mode on a 
computer. One technique used by attackers to establish connections to backdoors on a system 
is to activate a dedicated listening port. A remote port scanner will be able to detect active 
ports on a host. Abnormal port status may indicate the presence of unwanted functionality. 
While a port scanner is able to detect open ports, a vulnerability scanner performs several 
checks on opened ports to fingerprint the services running [34]. Various sequences of data can 
be sent to each port. The responses can be analyzed and compared to a list of signatures. This 
can help the user to evaluate which ports belong to legal services and which are opened by 
unauthorized software. 
 
Listing ports from a remote location serves at least one important advantage over listing ports 
locally on a host. Stealth software is able to manipulate the port status displayed to a user 
locally, but not the results collected remotely. Vulnerability scanners can add valuable 
information to an analysis, but suffer from the same drawbacks as other signature-based tools.  
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2.5.3. Botnet and Rootkit Detection  
This section will try to combine the theory on botnet and rootkit behaviour with the theory 
presented on malware detection. This will give guidance to how a behavioural analysis 
environment should be designed logically and physically, and what functionality is needed to 
detect the malicious instances.   
 
Looking at the host- and network related properties of bot software one by one; it is possible 
to determine which detection techniques should be best fit to discover the unwanted 
functionality during installation. This section sums up the theory presented on bot, rootkits 
and malware detection. 
 
2.5.3.1.Bot Detection – Host-Based 
Host control, presented in section 2.3.1.1, describes the mechanisms used by the bot software 
to manipulate the victim host once it has been compromised. Among other properties, adding 
functionality to automatically start after a computer reboot and patching of existing 
vulnerabilities are included. Wang et al [26] suggested monitoring auto-start extensibility 
points to determine installation of unwanted functionality, as presented in section 2.5.1.1. 
Hence, the registry or file entries a bot uses to start after a reboot should be able to detect 
through these principles. A remote vulnerability analysis before and after installation, can 
help determine if certain vulnerabilities are patched. Remote vulnerability checking is 
described by Skaggs et al [34], and presented in section 2.5.2.4. 
 
Obfuscation, presented in section 2.3.1.2, refers to mechanisms used to hide the actual content 
of what arrives and executes on a host. Introduced in section 2.5.1.4, Moffie et al [29] 
describe event monitoring as a method to determine what is really installed onto the computer. 
Obfuscation is a trick used to avoid signature based detection, thus during or after installation 
the functionality is the same each time the malware is run. File activity, process creation and 
the like can be observed to determine if some unwanted activity is introduced. 
 
Deception, presented in section 2.3.1.3, is described as mechanisms used to avoid detection 
once the bot is installed on a host. Deception mechanisms are strongly related to rootkit 
technology. Detection of bots utilizing deception strategies is therefore connected to rootkit 
detection, which is presented in section 2.5.3.3 
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2.5.3.2.Bot Detection – Network-Based 
Botnet control mechanisms were presented in section 2.3.2.1, and refer to mechanisms used 
by an attacker to remotely control the bots in his/her network. The most prevalent 
communication channels used by botnets are built on the IRC protocol. Also peer-to-peer 
protocols and web-protocols are used. Intrusion detection systems, presented in section 
2.5.2.2, can be configured to automatically detect the communication channels based on 
protocol headers and payload fields [10]. Mukherjee et al [31] have also suggested IDS to 
detect the presence of malware or intruders on a network.  
 
Delivery, propagation and exploit, presented in section 2.3.2.2, are properties connected with 
the automatic, worm like, distribution of bots. Also these properties can be detected by 
intrusion detection systems. IDS rules written to detect scanning patterns and executables 
transmitted on the network will raise alerts. Szor [6] suggested using access control records, 
described in section 2.5.2.1, to control the network traffic. Communication attempts to 
unauthorized parties will raise alerts or create log entries of the incidents.  
 
Obfuscation, presented in section 2.3.2.3 refers to techniques used to hide the actual content 
of what is transmitted across a network. Bots using obfuscation techniques specifically try to 
evade IDS detection and to pass firewalls. Access contol lists [6] will prevent communication 
with unauthorized parties, even if the traffic looks benign, and alerts can be raised if the rules 
are broken.  
 
Botnet server localization was presented in section 2.3.2.4, and refers to methods used by bots 
to determine the address of the botmasters command and control server. Bots will always 
have to contact a home server or peer-to-peer node to be able to join a botnet. This activity 
will always be possible to discover, either automatically via IDS or manually by inspecting a 
traffic dump of the network activity.  
 
2.5.3.3.Rootkit Detection 
Section 2.4.1.1 and 2.4.1.2 presented user-mode and kernel-mode rootkit technologies 
respectively.  
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Hoglund and Butler [11] suggest detecting rootkits by observing behaviour. If it is possible to 
determine if registry keys, files, processes or drivers are hidden from the user, one can 
conclude that some stealth software is used. Wang et al [27] presented cross-view diff, which 
is described in section 2.5.1.2. In [11] it is also suggested a rootkit detection method referred 
to as “guarding the doors”. Since all software must run in memory somewhere, one can look 
in the memory for malicious rootkit code to determine when it is loaded into memory. Section 
2.5.1.4 described monitoring events, proposed by Moffie et al [29]. When a rootkit is about to 
be installed, it is vulnerable as the stealth functionality is not yet loaded. Monitoring the 
events performed during installation can be utilized in a “guarding the doors” principle to 
detect unwanted interaction with kernel modules or user-mode libraries.  
 
Cross-time diff, presented in section 2.5.1.3, was suggested by Wang et al [27] and Kim et al 
[28] to detect the first versions of user-mode rootkits. If Trojan versions of known 
applications are used to hide files, ports or processes, an integrity checker would be able to 
detect this, given a clean baseline is used as comparison. 
 
Yet another technique presented by Hoglund and Butler [11] for discovering rootkits is to 
look for hooks. Hooking means interfering with a normal data execution flows either by 
interfering with library calls, system calls or data flows in the driver stack. These rootkit 
techniques were discussed in section 2.4.1.1 and 2.4.1.2. Libraries and kernel modules offer 
APIs to make the software environment extensible. Tables in the different libraries contain 
addresses to all API calls or services offered. These tables are imported by executing 
applications, so the right API or service can be addressed. By manipulating an address or 
service-table a rootkit can manipulate data flows to be passed to its own code before returned 
to the original receiver. There are numerous alternatives for where a hook can be placed. The 
detection procedure can be like finding a needle in a hay stack. There are however some entry 
points more used than others, and these are worth monitoring.   
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3. LABORATORY ENVIRONMENT 
In this chapter the laboratory equipment is described, and the software used to build the 
environment and the tools used in the analysis process are presented. Properties of the chosen 
analysis utilities will be connected to section 2.5, which explained malware detection. A 
further presentation of how the laboratory is set up and where the different tools are installed 
is presented in chapter 3.3. 
 
3.1. Hardware 
The hardware used in this test setup is superfluous equipment borrowed from SINTEF ICT 
and NTNU, and representative for what may exist in stores within different companies. 
 
 
Figure 6: Laboratory environment at SINTEF ICT. 
 
Figure 6 show the laboratory equipment in use. The computers from left are: Sherlock, 
Marple, Grissom (used as an external storage device), Horatio, Drew and Bond. Table 1 
illustrates the main specification of the different computers. In addition to what is presented in 
the table, each computer is equipped with an 80GB, 7200 rpm hard disk. Grissom is not part 
of the analysis environment, and therefore not further described.    
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Computer name System type Processor RAM NIC 
Sherlock Dell GX260 Pentium 4 2GHz 512MB 3 x 10/100 Mbps 
Marple Dell GX260 Pentium 4 2GHz 512MB 2 x 10/100Mbps 
Drew Dell GX260 Pentium 4 2GHz 512MB 1 x 10/100Mbps 
Bond Dell GX260 Pentium 4 2GHz 512MB 1 x 10/100Mbps 
Horatio Custom Built AMD Athlon 1,4GHz 1024MB 1 x 10/100Mbps 
 Table 1: Computer hardware specification  
 
From the table one can see the main limitation in capacity is memory. As further explained 
later, the laboratory is based on virtual machine technology. Each virtual machine will share 
hardware resources. A modern operating system should be run with at least 256MB RAM, 
thus most of the machines above should not handle more than one host operating system and 
one virtual guest system. At the most extreme, the whole laboratory environment could be 
reduced to one well equipped computer as long as virtual machine technology is used.  
 
Each machine is physically connected to the laboratory network via a 3COM OfficeConnect 
10/100MB 8 Port hub. Three 2-port KVM switches are used to reduce the amount of I/O 
devices needed.  
 
3.2. Software 
As previously mentioned, the software used to build the laboratory environment and the 
utilities used in the analysis process are all freely available with one exception; since the 
objects to be studied is designed for the MS Windows platform, one license of MS Windows 
XP is required.  
 
3.2.1. Basic Installation 
Every computer in the network is configured with the same basic setup, which consists of an 
operating system, virtual machine software, a system hardening tool and an integrity checker. 
In addition a GUI tool is installed to configure the built-in Linux firewall. 
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Ubuntu 6.10 Edgy Eft was chosen as the host operating system. Ubuntu is a Linux 
distribution developed with user-friendliness and security in mind. It is based on 
Debian GNU/Linux and the project has stated that Ubuntu will always be free of 
licence cost. Security patches are distributed on a regular basis and free support is 
offered. Network access can be configured using the built in iptables/netfilter [Web19] 
packet filtering framework. 
 
VMware Server 1.0.2 [Web20] was chosen as the virtualization system. VMware 
Server is a free product and offers the flexibility needed in a malware analysis 
scenario. It is required to agree to a license agreement and register at VMware before 
using this product. With this tool it is possible to create several virtual machines 
running in parallel inside the host operating system. Virtual machines and the host 
operating system share hardware resources, yet the virtualization technology prevent 
unauthorized interaction between virtual machines, and between virtual machine and 
the host system. This property is highly desirable when dealing with malware.  
 
Bastille Linux [Web21] is a system hardening tool proactively configuring an 
operating system with increased security. By “locking down” the operating system, 
Bastille will decrease its susceptibility to compromise. A series of security related 
questions are presented to the user when Bastille is run, among others who should 
have access to compilers and which services should be offered locally and remotely. 
Each question has a well documented description of consequences related to the 
different answers. With Bastille’s help, the most common techniques used by malware 
to infect a Linux system are eliminated from the list of possible attacks. Bastille Linux 
is free and published under the GNU/GPL license terms. 
 
Samhain [Web22] file integrity/intrusion detection system is used to further control 
the base of the laboratory environment. Samhain can be configured to keep status of 
files, processes, open ports and kernel modules, as the most important, in addition to 
other aspects. Checksums (TIGER192, SHA-1 or MD5) of the interesting objects are 
kept either locally or centrally and compared at a regular basis, or on demand. This 
technique corresponds to the cross-time diff approach explained in section 2.5.1.3. An 
integrity check of the kernel will make it possible to discover kernel-mode rootkits in 
Linux environments. Samhain is published under the GNU/GPL free software license.  
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Firestarter [Web23] offers an intuitive graphical user interface for configuration of 
the Linux firewall iptables. Network address translation, packet forwarding and packet 
filtering are easy to configure using this tool. GNU/GPL licensing is used to distribute 
this free utility.  
 
3.2.2. Test Environment – Analysis Tools 
In this section a presentation of the analysis tools used in the following experiments are 
described. Several tools used for host-based analysis of the Windows platform are provided 
free of charge from Microsoft Sysinternals, and a brief introduction is therefore appropriate.  
 
The Sysinternals web site [Web28] was founded in 1996 by Russinovich and Cogswell. They 
used the site to publish their self developed, advanced system utilities for Windows, including 
the source code, for free. In July 2006 Microsoft acquired Sysinternals. The system tools are 
still free to download and use, but regulated by a license agreement. The tools’ source code is 
no longer provided. 
   
3.2.2.1.Hosed-Based Analysis – Auto-Starting Extensibility Points 
Section 2.5.1.1 described the theories presented by Wang et al [26], where auto-starting 
extensibility point was suggested as variables to study when looking for malicious 
functionality.  
 
AutoRuns for Windows [Web24] is a utility with comprehensive knowledge of auto-
starting locations on the MS Windows platform. This utility is provided by Windows 
Sysinternals. The program can be configured to monitor locations that applications can 
use to start automatically either after reboot or together with MS Internet Explorer. 
Registry entries and start-up folders are typical locations that malware edits to survive 
reboots. Extensibility points offered by Internet Explorer, originally intended for 
benign toolbars or browser helper objects, are also popular places to manipulate. All of 
these points are monitored by AutoRuns. 
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3.2.2.2.Host-Based Analysis – Cross-View Diff   
Cross-view diff was presented in section 2.5.1.2. Wang et al [27] presented a theory where the 
idea was to compare results gained from requests to the operating system at two different 
levels.  
 
RootkitRevealer [Web25] from Sysinternals is a utility designed after the principles 
proposed in [27]. RootkitRevealer tries to find discrepancies in lists of files and 
registry settings collected from high-level API calls and low-level information 
gathered directly from the raw file system and registry. This utility only tries to find 
hidden files and registry settings, thus it is not able to detect malware that hides 
processes using the DKOM techniques explained in section 2.4.1.2. 
 
3.2.2.3.Host-Based Analysis – Cross-Time Diff  
Cross-time diff was presented in section 2.5.1.3. Wang et al [27] presented a theory where the 
idea was to compare the state of the operating system at two different times.  
 
Osiris [Web45] is a file integrity checker, which can be configured to monitor one 
single host or several hosts in a network. Once the baseline of a clean system is set, 
Osiris can monitor changes to chosen files and directories. Hash-values (MD-5 or 
SHA-1) of monitored objects are created to be able to discover modifications of files 
or folder content. The source code is provided and the application is free to use and 
modify as long as the terms in the application’s license agreement is followed.  
 
3.2.2.4.Host-Based Analysis – Event Monitoring    
In section 2.5.1.4, the details of event monitoring was explained. Moffie et al [29] suggested 
event monitoring techniques to detect malicious behaviour. API calls, file activity, process 
activity and the like can be watched to discover unwanted functionality. 
 
Process Explorer [Web26] is yet another tool from Windows Sysinternals. It is a nice 
graphical tool used to display currently running processes. Each process’ resource 
usage is displayed, and a list of which libraries, files or registry keys it has opened can 
be seen. As soon as a new process is created, it will be shown in Process Explorer. 
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Process Monitor [Web27], also a Windows Sysinternal tool, is an advanced utility for 
Windows. It is able to show all file, registry and process/thread activity on a computer 
in real-time. A filter module makes it possible to only display activity of interest. The 
activity can be logged to a file for in-depth analysis at a later time.  
 
These tools have overlapping functionality. Together they will make a pretty complete picture 
of what events took place during execution of given applications. 
 
3.2.2.5.Host-Based Analysis – Rootkit Detection 
Rootkit detection techniques were studied in section 2.5.3.3. Hoglund and Butler [11] 
suggested looking for API hooks i.e. look for places where rootkits intercept regular 
dataflows. Together with Wang et al [27], they also suggest using cross-view diff approaches 
to discover rootkits. 
 
RootkitRevealer from Sysinternals follows the cross-view diff approach. A further 
description is found in section 3.2.2.2. 
 
Gmer [Web46] is a rootkit detection tool utilizing both cross-view diff principles to 
detect hidden files, processes, registry settings, services and drivers. The tool also scan 
the host for API hooking applications. Gmer is freely distributed.   
 
3.2.2.6.Network-Based Analysis – Access Control, IDS, Honeypots 
In section 2.5.2, network-based malware detection techniques were introduced. Szor [6] 
described access control via router access lists, Mukherjee et al [31], among others, suggested 
IDS solutions and Spitzner [8] presented honeypot technology to study and fight the attackers.  
 
The Honeynet Project [Web30], where Spitzner is president, is a non-profit volunteer research 
organization. Their goal is to improve security on the Internet at no cost to the public. Several 
honeypot tools are available through the project, among them the high-interaction honeypot 
tool Honeywall Roo. This tool combines all the functionality presented in [6, 8, 31]. Every 
utility presented next is published under the GNU/GPL license. 
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Honeywall Roo is a preconfigured environment where several tools are included to be 
able to monitor attacker’s behaviour on a compromised system. When installing 
Honeywall, the chosen computer is turned into a layer-two bridge. Network traffic is 
passed through the bridge and since it is operational on the data link layer, attackers 
will have difficulty detecting its presence. A Honeywall is typically placed between a 
honeypot and the Internet to be able to intercept all traffic sent to and from a 
compromised host/honeypot. All network activity is automatically logged and stored 
in a database. Honeywall Roo is built on the Fedora Core Linux distribution. Data 
capture and analysis tools included in the Honeywall environment are Snort, 
Oinkmaster and Walleye, among others. Walleye is a web interface used to present 
and analyze captured data. The other tools are presented next. 
 
Snort [Web31] is an open source intrusion detection system. IDSs were presented in 
section 2.5.2.2. Snort detection is built on a rule driven language. Detection of 
unwanted network activity can be based either on signature-based approaches, 
protocol or anomaly detection. The rule set is flexible and it is easy to include self 
written rules. A traditional intrusion detection system will inspect network traffic and 
raise alerts if a given rule is matched. Snort can operate in a mode called Snort Inline. 
Running in this mode Snort can act as an intrusion prevention system (IPS). The 
difference between IDS versus IPS is that where an IDS will raise alerts, but still allow 
the traffic to pass, an IPS can actively block the traffic. Snort is configured in Inline 
mode in the Honeywall configuration. 
 
Oinkmaster [Web32] is a perl script designed to automate the process of updating and 
managing Snort rules. 
 
In addition to the tools described above, which automates the process of detecting unwanted 
network traffic, one additional tool is used.  To be absolutely sure no events pass by 
unnoticed; a packet sniffer logging all network activity, in addition to the Honeywall, is used. 
This will make it possible to manually inspect every packet sent on the network. 
 
Wireshark [Web33] is a free network protocol analyzer published under the 
GNU/GPL license. It is able to collect every packet of data sent on network.  Traffic 
flows can be analysed in a nice, intuitive graphical user interface. It can also read data 
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from a variety of platforms like token ring and Ethernet, among others. Ethereal has an 
extensive list of protocols, which it can dissect. Users can easily configure own 
display filters for the captured traffic.  
 
3.2.2.7.Network-Based Analysis – Remote Vulnerability Checking 
Remote vulnerability checking was presented in section 2.5.2.4. Skaggs et al [34] proposed 
this method to detect unwanted functionality on a host. Two different utilities are used to scan 
for remote vulnerabilities. 
 
Nmap [Web34] is a free open source utility for network exploration and security 
auditing, and follows the terms of GNU/GPL licensing. It is designed to scan large 
networks in a short amount of time. It is easily configured to scan given hosts or entire 
network segments. Nmap can return reports on which hosts are available, which 
services they are offering and which operating system the remote hosts are running on. 
   
Nessus [Web35] is a remote vulnerability scanner. Updated signature files of known 
vulnerabilities are provided by the developers of Nessus and can be installed as plug-
ins to the program. Nessus does scanning of remote machines or entire networks. 
Initially the application starts out by doing a port scan of the target. Next, probes of 
known attack patterns are sent to see if there is any response. Based on the collected 
data, reports of security related importance is generated. As is the case with every 
other signature based system, like for instance Anti-Virus software, detection of 
security holes with Nessus is dependent on the presence of a matching signature rule 
set. Nessus is regulated by a license agreement, and one has to register at the web site 
before the tool can be used. Access to the latest Nessus security plug-ins can be 
bought. However, all plug-ins are distributed for free with a 7 days delay. The tool 
itself is free to use. 
 
3.2.2.8.Malware Detection – Traditional Anti-Virus 
The focus of this work is to analyze software behavior. To be able to determine which exact 
malware specimens were studied, a traditional anti-virus tool was used. An anti-virus scan 
was performed on every application studied after the behavioral tests to see if the conclusions 
regarding the test objects were right. 
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ClamWin [Web36] is a free open source anti-virus tool for the MS Windows platform 
published under the GNU/GPL license. Virus scans are started on demand. It is a 
signature-based detection engine, and updated signature files can be automatically 
downloaded.  
3.3. Design and Implementation of Test Environment 
In this chapter the laboratory environment is described, and arguments of the design 
principles are given. Applications in use are presented in italic, and their descriptions are 
found in section 3.2. Figure 7 illustrates the current setup. 
 
 
Internet HUB
Sherlock
BondHoratio
Drew
Marple
Admin
eth1eth0
IP: 192.168.0.21
IP: 192.168.0.11IP: 192.168.0.31
IP: 129.241.252.124
IP: 129.241.252.118
Services:
Firewall
NAT
DNS
Services:
Honeywall
IP: 192.168.0.1
 
Figure 7: Realization of the laboratory environment. 
This picture illustrates how the laboratory environment is realized. Sherlock act as the 
firewall, Marple is configured with Honeywall software, Horatio act as a remote vulnerability 
scanner, Drew is a network sniffer and Bond is the victim to observe.  
 
The laboratory is based on virtual machines because of the flexibility offered by virtualization 
technology. When dealing with malware, the risk of infecting the entire laboratory 
environment is present. With VMware Server, used in this setting, each virtual host can be 
reverted to a previously known clean state in seconds. In comparison, formatting a hard drive 
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and installing an operating system with necessary applications from scratch can take more 
than an hour.  
 
Natvig [4], among others, has explained the risk of malware escaping virtual environments. 
The initial laboratory environment designed in fall 2006 [12] was, like the current setup, 
based on virtual machine technology. The operating systems in which the virtual machines 
were run was, however, MS Windows 2000. Both the work presented in this report and the 
previous work, had a focus on analyzing malicious code written for MS Windows systems. 
The risk of infecting the entire laboratory was therefore present in the previous setup. The 
probability of malware being able to infect both Windows and Linux system is relatively low, 
though present. To reduce the risk of malware escaping the virtual environment and infecting 
the host operating system, Ubuntu Linux is installed as a base operating system in the 
laboratory.  
 
To further reduce the risk of unwanted infections, Bastille is used to harden the Linux 
environment. Administrative tools are restricted to root, and services not necessary are 
disabled. The configuration of Bastille can be found in appendix B. Samhain, the file integrity 
checker, is used to control important operating system files and the kernel-module for 
infections. Samhain is also configured to control the integrity of the virtual machine files. 
This is to ensure an uninfected version of the virtual guest OS is run for each test.  
 
In addition to making the laboratory more secure from being unintentionally infected, one 
major improvement is made to the setup presented in [12] and Figure 1. This improvement 
involves the use of Honeywall Roo. The Honeywall is installed on Marple and was motivated 
by a malware trend presented in [Web1], which explained the use of staged downloads of 
malware.  
 
In an isolated, sandbox like environment, only the installation file distributed in the first stage 
of the malware replication could have been tested for unwanted functionality. Malicious 
content can very well be hidden in the code downloaded during the installation process. It is a 
realistic scenario that software repositories can be compromised and benign software replaced 
with Trojan versions. A more secure way of connecting to Internet than giving full access, is 
thus needed to provide more flexibility. In a worst case scenario e.g. the Google Desktop 
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installer file could be a Trojan horse modified to download a bot binary. This bot could start 
infecting other machines instantly or force the laboratory computer to participate in a DDoS 
attack.  
 
The Honeywall is installed as a layer-two bridge inserted between the hosts in the laboratory 
setup and the firewall. This ensures every single data packet directed towards Internet is 
inspected before they reach the net. As explained in the previous chapter, Honeywall Roo 
includes the IDS Snort in inline mode. This means it can block the Internet connection if 
malicious network traffic is found. For instance, the replication attempt of a worm can be 
detected and blocked. The Honeywall can also be set up to allow a maximum number of 
connections per time unit. Internet access is blocked if the number of connections are 
exceeded. By modifying these parameters, one can prevent worms from scanning for new 
vulnerable hosts, or prevent laboratory computers from being participants in DoS attacks. 
From Figure 7 one can see where the Honeywall is placed. The introduction of the high-
interaction honeypot technology increases the flexibility of the behavioural analysis 
environment considerably.  
 
Iptables is used to configure Sherlock to become a firewall with NAT functionality. The 
firewall is controlled graphically via firestarter. It can be configured to allow separate hosts 
Internet access or Internet access based on communication protocols. By default, in this setup, 
the firewall is configured to block all inbound and outbound access. NAT is used to give the 
laboratory machines private, un-routable IP addresses. This is to make certain they do not 
communicate with other machines outside the test environment via other channels than 
through Sherlock, the NAT gateway. The honeywall has an administrative network interface 
which, even though unlikely, could be used by attackers to escape the laboratory environment.  
 
Sherlock is also equipped with its own DNS service. Some malware attack the DNS system.  
By controlling and giving access only to an internal DNS server one ensures production 
systems are not attacked. This setup also allows laboratory computer access to DNS services 
without any direct communication with servers outside the test network.   
 
Iptables controlled through firestarter, ensures network connections to each Linux host in the 
network is rejected, thus infections through network replication are avoided.  
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It is crucial to keep the risk of each test as low as possible. An infected laboratory machine 
being able to compromise computers outside the laboratory environment can lead to serious 
legal consequences.      
 
 
Computer Name Host Operating System Virtual Guest Operating System 
Sherlock Ubuntu Edgy Eft 
- VMware Server 
- Bastille 
- Samhain 
- Firestarter 
- Bind9, DNS server 
Ubuntu Edgy Eft 
- Bastille 
- Samhain 
- Firestarter 
 
Marple Ubuntu Edgy Eft 
- VMware Server 
- Bastille 
- Samhain 
- Firestarter 
Honeywall Roo 
- Snort 
- Oinkmaster 
- Sebek server 
Horatio Ubuntu Edgy Eft 
- VMware Server 
- Bastille 
- Samhain 
- Firestarter 
Ubuntu Edgy Eft 
- Bastille 
- Samhain 
- Firestarter 
- Nmap 
- Nessus 
Drew Ubuntu Edgy Eft 
- VMware Server 
- Bastille 
- Samhain 
- Firestarter 
Ubuntu Edgy Eft 
- Bastille 
- Samhain 
- Firestarter 
- Wireshark 
Bond Ubuntu Edgy Eft 
- VMware Server 
- Bastille 
- Samhain 
- Firestarter 
Microsoft Windows XP SP2 
- ProcessMonitor 
- ProcessExplorer 
- RootkitRevealer 
- AutoRuns 
- Osiris 
- Gmer 
 
Table 2: Overview of operating systems and tools installed on the different computers.  
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Table 2 illustrates which operating systems and tools are installed on the different machines in 
the laboratory environment. During the project assignment of fall 2006 [12], three roles were 
identified and should be covered in a network-based detection scenario; a victim, an 
eavesdropper and an attacker. The victim is the host to be analyzed and where the object to be 
scrutinized should be installed. The eavesdropper should silently listen in to all traffic to be 
able to determine if any malicious data is sent. The attacker should actively probe the victim 
for vulnerabilities by simulating attacker behaviour. In the laboratory setup presented in 
Figure 7, Bond is the victim, Drew and Marple are the eavesdroppers and Horatio is the 
attacker. For a further reasoning behind the roles, it is referred to [12]. 
 
Drew and Marple have overlapping functionality. Both record all data activity on the network. 
Drew could be removed without loss of functionality. However, this computer is kept in the 
laboratory setup for security reasons. As figure 7 indicates, the data flow to Drew goes one 
way. Appendix E sketches a receive-only Ethernet cable used connect this computer to the 
network. By physically cutting the transmitting wires, Drew is physically unable to 
communicate with the other laboratory computers and vice versa. This will eliminate the risk 
of this machine of being infected by automated infection procedures. Still, the receive-only 
cable allows sniffing data from the network. In a worst case scenario where every other 
machine in the laboratory environment became infected and log files deleted, Drew would 
contain an image of the contamination phase.     
 
When setting up a host-based analysis environment, the malware detection theory presented in 
section 2.5.1 was deciding for which properties should be included in the analysis tools. Each 
theory presented represents different approaches to malware detection. None of the existing 
tools found, include properties from all malware detection approaches. This is why several 
tools are used, each containing interesting elements for a behavioural analysis. 
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4. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS 
The experiments performed during this work were carried out with bot code caught in the 
wild. The rootkit analyzed was, however, downloaded from [Web39] and is an example of 
how a pure rootkit may be implemented.  
 
In the following a brief introduction to how the malware was collected is given. Next, one 
detailed example of behavioural software analysis is presented. This will introduce how the 
experimentation and analysis phase was performed. The most important findings of the other 
tests are summarized at the end of this chapter.  
 
4.1. Preparation – Collecting Malware 
Three different sources were used to acquire bot code; the file-sharing network Kazaa, a 
medium-interaction honeypot called Nepenthes and a contribution from Einar Oftedal at 
NorCERT. The fourth malware source was, as mentioned, [Web39] the web site of Hoglund 
and Butler. 
 
The introduction to chapter 1 presented the work of Shin et al [1], where malware prevalence 
in the Kazaa file-sharing network was explored. They discovered that by using the search 
phrase “ICQ”, the chances of hitting downloadable files infected with malware were more 
than 70%. This result was used as motivation for the use of Kazaa as a source for 
downloading active malware.  
 
Kazaa [Web44] was installed on Bond in the laboratory network presented in chapter 3.3. 
Once Kazaa was installed and Bond connected to the Kazaa network, “ICQ” and “WinZip” 
was used as search phrases. Every ICQ and Winzip application found was downloaded. It 
turned out that seven out seven downloaded applications were Trojan horses. The downloaded 
applications were named: 
- ICQ hacks.exe 
- ICQ Lite (new).exe 
- ICQ Lite beta (b2253).exe 
- ICQ Pro 2003a.exe 
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- ICQ Pro 2003a beta (b4600).exe 
- ICQ Pro 2003b (new beta).exe 
- Winzip_Crack.exe 
This simple experiment was only used to get the hands on malware currently active on the 
Internet. It is not meant to contribute to the work of Shin et al or to be concluded in any way. 
It is, however, interesting to see that the threats of downloading infected files from file-
sharing networks are real.  
 
More malware was collected through use of the medium-interaction honeypot Nepenthes 
[Web40]. Nepenthes is a honeypot sensor that simulates several different vulnerable services, 
which are exploited by auto-replicating malware. The sensor is connected to Internet, and 
once an exploit attempt is made on one of the emulated services, a download handler tries to 
download the malware that initiated the connection. A hash value of each downloaded file is 
calculated to ensure each malicious specimen is only stored once. Several connection 
attempts were made towards the sensor, but only four successful unique downloads were 
made through a two months period. The names of the downloaded files were: 
- Internat.exe, caught twice 
- Winlist.exe, caught twice 
Internat.exe and Winlist.exe were both downloaded twice, but with different hash values. 
Different hash values may indicate that the malware bodies of Internat.exe and Winlist.exe 
have mutated. Except for these comments, other aspects of the Nepenthes experiments are 
not considered.  
 
The last source of malicious bot code was Einar Oftedal at NorCERT who contributed to this 
work with two bot-binaries; one IRC based and one peer-to-peer based, called bot.exe and 
via.exe respectively.  
 
In addition to the bot code presented, the behaviour of one rootkit, HackerDefender [Web6], 
is analyzed. Some background knowledge of this rootkit is useful when looking at the 
following test results. 
 
HackerDefender is a user-mode rootkit capable of hiding processes, files, folders, registry 
settings and communication ports. The rootkit hooks into system libraries to be able to 
intercept and manipulate data-flows between applications and the operating system. 
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Backdoors are created by hooking into every previously opened communication port to be 
able to hide from both local and remote port listing tools. Specially crafted HackerDefender 
packets sent to each port are handled by the rootkit. Every other packed is forwarded to the 
service that originally opened the port. 
 
4.2. Experiments 
In this section, one experiment is presented in detail. This is to demonstrate how the 
laboratory environment, that is designed based on the dynamic behavioural malware detection 
theory presented in section 2.5, can be used to discover unwanted functionality in software. 
Each test is performed following the same routines, which are described in appendix C, to 
make sure the results are comparable. 
 
ICQ Lite (new).exe is a Trojan horse downloaded from the Kazaa file-sharing network and 
will be used in the following case to demonstrate the usefulness of a behavioural analysis. The 
motivation behind this work was given in chapter 1. It was stated that to run applications 
downloaded from unknown sources may be risky. Traditional anti-virus detection schemes 
have limitations when it comes to the ability to detect previously unknown malware. Thus, it 
may be difficult to determine whether applications are manipulated by third parties to contain 
unwanted functionality or not, by the use of traditional detection tools. ICQ Lite (new).exe is 
an example emphasizing the worries addressed in the introduction to this report. 
 
ICQ is a freely available instant messaging application with an official home page [Web42] 
where the application can be downloaded. File-sharing networks, however, are popular and 
many prefer these file-sharing points to download their software. By its name, ICQ Lite 
(new).exe looks like a benign application that very well could have been an official software 
distribution. A person eager to be part of the ICQ instant messaging community, may 
download ICQ Lite (new).exe ignorant of the fact that it really is a Trojan horse concealing a 
malicious bot with replication characteristics of peer-to-peer worms, which will be 
demonstrated next. 
  
After a double-click on the newly acquired application, one would expect an installation 
procedure to start. However, nothing seemed to happen after activating the executable. An 
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unskilled/ignorant user would probably conclude that the file was broken and try new 
downloads. The next sections will demonstrate how the behavioural analysis laboratory can 
be used to determine what really happens after files are opened.   
 
Each of the experiments performed in the laboratory were conducted twice. The first run was 
performed without any connection to Internet. The firewall, Sherlock, was configured to block 
all traffic to and from the laboratory network. Data was logged for five minutes after 
activation of the objects to analyze. In the second run, the same procedure was followed. 
However, after five minutes had passed, the firewall was configured to allow DNS traffic. 
Data was recorded for three more minutes. The laboratory setup contains its own DNS server. 
The victim computer was never allowed direct connection with any computers outside the 
laboratory environment. 
 
4.2.1. Host-Based Behavioural Analysis 
Six different tools were used locally on Bond to capture behaviour related data. AutoRuns, 
Osiris, ProcessExplorer, ProcessMonitor, RootkitRevealer and Gmer, as explained earlier.  
 
4.2.1.1.Event Monitoring – ProcessExplorer 
ProcessExplorer gives a graphical representation of each running process in real time. 
Observing process activity fall under the event monitoring principles of Moffie et al [29]. By 
having this utility up and running, one can see which processes are opened and closed by 
highlighted colours. Currently running processes are also displayed. Observing the output of 
this application gave the first indication of the installation of suspicious functionality. As 
mentioned earlier, nothing seemed to happen when the ICQ Lite application was run. 
ProcessExplorer, however, reported the creation of a running process. 
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Figure 8: ProcessExplorer displaying running processes.  
 
Figure 8 illustrates the system before and after ICQ Lite was run. The picture in front 
represents the system after double-clicking the file, while the same system is presented in the 
background before activation of the application. Even though the user never was presented 
with any installation information after double-clicking the application, ProcessExplorer 
reported a new active process. System32.exe, highlighted in purple, looked very suspicious. 
ProcessExplorer can be set to highlight different attributes according to predefined rules. 
Packed processes were chosen to be highlighted by the colour purple. Section 2.3.1.2 
explained obfuscation as a principle used by bots, and malware in general, to try to evade 
signature-based detection, among other tings. 
  
As little could be concluded so far, more tests had to be performed. The process was not 
proved to be created as a direct consequence of double-clicking the ICQ Lite file. 
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4.2.1.2.Auto-Start Extensibility Points – AutoRuns   
AutoRuns was used to determine if the newly discovered process would try to start up 
automatically after a reboot. By monitoring the auto-start extensibility points according to the 
principles suggested by Wang et al [26], AutoRuns could give valuable information of which 
techniques the process would use to survive reboots. 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Auto-start extensibility point discovered with AutoRuns. 1 and 2 points 
towards the same registry path on a clean and compromised computer, respectively. 
 
Figure 9 illustrates the fact that after the ICQ Lite application was run, a new registry key had 
been inserted into the path:  
- HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurentVersion\Winlogon\Shell 
This registry path determines which processes should automatically start when users log into 
the Windows operating system. On the known clean system only Explorer.exe, the Windows 
graphical user interface, should be started at login. After activation of ICQ Lite, the 
System32.exe process was also configured to start automatically. 
 
Even though it seemed probable the System32.exe process was created as a consequence of 
double-clicking ICQ Lite (new).exe, the evidence was still missing. 
 
2 
1 
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4.2.1.3.Cross-time diff – Osiris 
The registry key added to survive reboots pointed to the file path:  
- C:\WINDOWS\System32\System32.exe 
To determine whether this file existed before ICQ Lite was run, or if it was new to the system, 
a file integrity check, using Osiris, was performed. This check could even reveal if other new 
files were created or if existing files had been changed. This test follows the cross-time diff 
principles suggested by Wang et al [27] and Kim and Spafford [28]. 
 
 
Figure 10: Output of an Osiris file-integrity check. 
 
As Figure 10 illustrates, two new files existed on the system after the baseline of a clean 
system was created. ICQ Lite (new).exe was intentionally copied onto the system to perform 
the test. System32.exe, however, was new. No7 other file changing operations than copying 
the ICQ application had been performed on the computer since the integrity baseline was 
created. The probability of coherence between the introduction of ICQ Lite (new).exe and the 
creation of system32.exe was therefore increasing.  
 
                                                 
7 The configuration file was changed intentionally before the integrity check, hence the changes to host.conf 
displayed in Figure 10. 
New files 
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4.2.1.4.Event Monitoring – ProcessMonitor 
So far, the event-monitoring principle suggested by Moffie et al[29] was covered by 
ProcessExporer, where the running system32.exe process was first discovered. 
ProcessMonitor is a more comprehensive application and, as described earlier, capable of 
recording events created by file-, process- and registry activity. This application was set to 
monitor every event on the system from before the activation of ICQ Lite and for five minutes 
after. 
 
By studying the ProcessMonitor log-file, displayed in Figure 11, one could see that the 
process ICQ Lite (new).exe created the file system32.exe (1). Further, the content of ICQ Lite 
(new).exe was copied to the system32.exe file (2).   
 
 
Figure 11: Log extract from ProcessMonitor data. 1 shows creation of the system32.exe 
file and 2 shows file content copied from ICQ Lite (new).exe to the new file. 
 
This was the final proof of connection between the activation of the seemingly corrupted ICQ 
application and the system32.exe process. The log-file did not show any evidence of more 
files created, which correlates with the results of the file-integrity check.   
 
Further, the insertion of the registry key leading to the process being able to survive reboots 
could be found by studying the registry related part of the log-file, illustrated by Figure 12. 
 
1 
2 
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Figure 12: ProcessMonitor log extract showing insertion (RegSetValue) of the registry 
key leading to auto-starting properties. 
 
By observing process related events, one could extract more interesting information about the 
hidden functionality of the ICQ Lite application.  
  
 
Figure 13: Process related extract from the ProcessMonitor log-file. 
 
Figure 13 shows an extract of the process related events that took place once the file 
downloaded from Kazaa was double-clicked. The ICQ Lite process created and started the 
system32 process (1), and then shut itself down (2). (3) shows some of the libraries loaded 
into the system32 process. Several of the libraries loaded, contained APIs to network-related 
functions. 
1 
2 
3 
Master’s Thesis 
     65
 
- ntdll.dll 
- kernel32.dll 
- advapi32.dll 
- rpcrt4.dll 
- msvcrt.dll 
 
- shell32.dll 
- gdi32.dll 
- user32.dll 
- shlwapi.dll 
- comctl32.dll 
 
- wininet.dll 
- crypt32.dll 
- msasn1.dll 
- oleaut32.dll 
- ws2_32.dll 
 
- ws2help.dll 
- icmp.dll 
- iphlpapi.dll 
- secur32.dll 
- urlmon.dll 
 
- version.dll 
- wsock32.dll 
- mswsock.dll 
- dnsapi.dll 
- winrnr.dll 
- wldap32.dll 
Table 3: Full list of libraries loaded into the system32.exe process. Bold indicates 
libraries that provide networking functions. 
 
Table 3 shows the full list of libraries loaded into the suspicious process’ memory. Several of 
them, displayed in bold text, provide functions necessary to establish network connections. 
Information on the libraries was found using [Web43].   
 
The circumstantial evidence found so far strongly indicated the ICQ Lite (new).exe file 
downloaded from Kazaa was a Trojan horse, most probably designed to communicate/spread 
via networks.  
 
4.2.2. Network-Based Behavioural Analysis 
To detect network related behaviour, the Honeywall Roo was used in concert with the remote 
vulnerability scanners Nmap and Nessus. As presented earlier, the Honeywall logs every 
packet sent on the network, in addition to supervise network connections with the intrusion 
detection system Snort. Wireshark was used to display the packet dump from Honeywall Roo. 
 
4.2.2.1.ACR, IDS, Honeypots – Honeywall Roo 
At the end of section 4.2.1, it was strongly suggested the ICQ Lite application installed was a 
Trojan horse, most probably able to communicate/spread via networks. The Honeywall Roo 
was included in the laboratory environment to support network-based detection of hidden 
functionality, according to principles described by Szor [6] on access control records, 
Mukherjee et al [31] on intrusion detection systems and Spitzner [8] on honeypots. 
 
Detection of unwanted functionality through network traffic observation could turn out 
helpful in determining whether the running process, system32.exe, really was a malicious 
Trojan horse or not. 
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Figure 14: Extract of the traffic dump collected through the Honeywall. 
 
Section 2.3.2.4 explained that an important bot characteristic was the botnet server 
localization. Figure 14 shows an extract of the traffic dump collected by the Honewall. 
Wireshark, used to display the logged traffic, highlights traffic using different communication 
protocols in various colours. After activation of the Trojan horse on Bond, DNS queries (blue) 
and NBNS8 (yellow) queries were made. The installed Trojan obviously tried to contact its 
home server(s). As Figure 14 shows, two different servers were tried contacted; t69net1.ath.cx 
(1) and t69net2.ath.cx (2). 
 
As mentioned earlier, each experiment was run twice. The first time without any Internet 
access, and the second time with DNS enabled.  
 
                                                 
8 NetBIOS Name Servise is a Microsoft proprietary service converting IP addresses to human readable names. 
1 
2 
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Figure 15: Extract of the traffic dump collected through the Honeywall immediately 
after DNS was activated. 
 
Figure 15 illustrates what happened immediately after access to the DNS server was allowed. 
Once the DNS queries resolved the server name to an IP address, connection attempts were 
tried towards the IP address. There are two especially interesting observations shown in the 
picture. The first arrow points towards the source ports used during the connection attempts. 
After two connection attempts from each source port, the value of the port number was 
incremented by one. The reason for this is most likely that the Trojan horse tried to evade the 
firewall that was blocking the connection attempts. By trying different source ports it could, 
in the real world, eventually hit an open port.  
 
The second arrow is pointed towards the destination port of the connection attempts. Port 
6667 on the remote host was tried contacted. Port 6667 is commonly used by IRC networks. 
The home server localization procedure, followed by connection attempts using a common 
IRC port, could be indicating a bot was installed.  
 
4.2.2.2.Remote Vulnerability Checking – Nmap and Nessus  
To further investigate the victim, remote vulnerability checking was performed. Skaggs et al 
[34] suggested vulnerability checking to look for backdoors and the like. These checks could 
1 2 
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also be used to determine whether existing vulnerabilities on the victim had been patched or if 
new vulnerabilities were introduced. 
 
In the first experiment run, without DNS access, Nmap was used to quickly determine the port 
status of the victim. An Nmap scan made before the ICQ Lite application was introduced, 
reported the status to be as shown in Figure 16. Three ports, 135, 139 and 445, were open. 
 
Not shown: 65532 closed ports 
PORT    STATE SERVICE 
135/tcp open  msrpc 
139/tcp open  netbios-ssn 
445/tcp open  microsoft-ds 
Figure 16: Nmap scan result of a clean system 
 
The Nmap scan made after the suspicious system32 process had started running, gave the 
same result. To verify this, a Nessus scan was performed and the results from this utility 
before and after installation of ICQ Lite were compared. Neither Nessus nor Nmap could find 
any changes on the victim host.  
 
In the second experiment run, things started happening when the victim successfully 
performed a DNS query. An Nmap scan made after the connection attempts illustrated in 
Figure 15 returned an interesting result. 
 
Not shown: 65531 closed ports 
PORT    STATE SERVICE      VERSION 
113/tcp open  auth? 
135/tcp open  msrpc        Microsoft Windows RPC 
139/tcp open  netbios-ssn 
445/tcp open  microsoft-ds Microsoft Windows XP microsoft-ds 
  Figure 17: Nmap scan of compromised system, after successful DNS queries. 
 
Figure 17 illustrates the results returned by the Nmap scan performed after DNS access was 
given. In addition to the three open ports found on a clean system, port 113 was reported 
open. RFC 1700 [35] reserves this port to authentication services. The introduction of a new 
opened listening port to the system looked very suspicious. With all the information collected 
earlier in mind, the most likely explanation to this new port was that a backdoor had been 
installed on the system.  
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Nessus was run to se if any of the open ports responded to attacker like behaviour. 
 
 
Figure 18: Extract from the Nessus scan report created after DNS access was given. 
 
Figure 18 shows an extract of the scan report generated by Nessus. One of Nessus’ plug-in 
modules recognized the response of port 113 during the scan. The port was opened as a 
backdoor, and Nessus strongly suggested a bot variant was responsible.  
 
By looking at all the evidence collected so far, this scan report added the final evidence for 
believing the ICQ Lite (new).exe really was a Trojan horse hiding bot functionality.  
 
4.2.3. Host-Based Behavioural Analysis - Revisited   
ProcessExplorer was the first application used in this test to discover suspicious activity. This 
utility has another nifty function in addition to what is presented so far; it has the ability to 
read strings from each process, both from the process image on the hard disk and from the 
process running in memory. Even though this subject may border to static analysis techniques, 
it is well worth mentioning.  
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String dump from image String dump from memory 
eOM. 
gwK 
mto 
dr~j 
Teg_ 
c^&sH 
mAX 
J#ya 
KPA 
pyLi4 
&Cy6u 
mkO2K0 
pDH{x 
q(_HV 
YCZ 
TRA 
#Jjg 
-ipx 
Jso 
password accepted. 
*failed host auth by %s(%s). 
NOTICE %s :host auth failed. 
NOTICE %s : 
PING %s 
PING 
NOTICE %s : 
VERSION %s 
VERSION 
*failed pass auth by %s(%s). 
NOTICE %s :your attempt has been logged. 
NOTICE %s :pass auth failed. 
hook 
*failed cmd exec by %s(%s) with cmd %s. 
KICK %s %s :%s 
MODE %s +b *!%s 
NOTICE 
PRIVMSG 
joined channel %s. 
Table 4: Extract from string dump of a process’ image file and from a process running 
in memory9. 
 
Table 4 illustrates the usefulness of reading strings from processes running in memory. To the 
left is an extract of the string dump from the System32.exe image file. The result is consistent 
with the fact that the process is reported to be packed. Only a limited amount of information 
can be collected from the packed application body. Processes running in memory, however, 
are de-packed/decrypted to their original content. Dumping strings from processes running in 
memory may therefore lead to important information, as displayed in the right column in 
Table 4. Section 2.3.2.1 described botnet control mechanisms, where words like NOTICE and 
PRIVMSG, among others, are defined by the IRC protocol and therefore also related to 
control of IRC bots.  
 
The string dump from the running process concluded all suspicions towards the ICQ Lite 
application. By downloading and installing what looked like a benign application, the victim 
computer became infected with a malicious Trojan horse concealing an IRC bot. 
                                                 
9 The table columns are not correlated. They are randomly extracted from the string dumps. 
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Event though the limitation set in section 1.4 limits the analysis of registry activity to looking 
at the insertion of registry keys, curiosity led to an important discovery that should be 
mentioned. When studying the ICQ Lite application the following observation was made:  
 
 
Figure 19: Malicious process looking for installed applications. 
 
Figure 19 shows how the malicious system32 process, created by ICQ Lite (new).exe, tries to 
open registry keys belonging to the Kazaa and iMesh10 applications. As the figure shows, 
these registry keys were not found on the test system. Clearly, this query had to mean 
something. To do a further investigation of the Trojan application, Kazaa was installed on a 
clean system. Next, the ICQ Lite application was installed, and the same tests as presented 
above were performed. 
 
The result was quite interesting. The ProcessMonitor log file revealed that an extensive list of 
new files had been created on the system. 
 
Battlefield1942_keygen.exe 
WinZip 9.0b.exe 
SmartFTP 2.0.0.exe 
ICQ Lite (new).exe 
ICQ Pro 2003b (new beta).exe 
ICQ Pro 2003a.exe 
AOL Instant Messenger.exe 
Winamp 3.8.exe 
MediaPlayer Update.exe 
UT2003_patch.exe 
KaZaA Hack 2.5.0.exe 
DirectDVD 5.0.exe 
Flash MX crack (trial).exe 
Ad-aware 6.5.exe 
GTA 3 Crack.exe 
GTA 3 patch (no cd).exe 
Hitman_2_no_cd_crack.exe 
Mafia_crack.exe 
Neverwinter_Nights_licence.exe 
NHL 2003 crack.exe 
WarCraft_3_crack.exe 
ACDSee 5.5.exe 
DivX Video Bundle 6.5.exe 
Global DiVX Player 3.0.exe 
QuickTime_Pro_Crack.exe 
KaZaA Lite (New).exe 
iMesh 3.7b (beta).exe 
iMesh 3.6.exe 
Table 5: Extract of files created by the system32 process. 
 
                                                 
10 iMesh is a file-sharing utility similar to Kazaa. 
Detection of Malicious Software Functionality  
 
     
 
72
Table 5 shows an extract of the executable files generated once the ICQ Lite application was 
installed on a system with the Kazaa application present. A total of 94 different files were 
generated and placed in a folder that was shared to the Kazaa network.  
 
This illustrates that the behaviour observed during installation is dependant on the 
environment applications are installed onto.  
 
4.2.4. Test Results – Summary  
The following section will try to summarize the most important findings from each test. The 
results are obtained in accordance with the data collected through the thorough example given 
above. Emphasize is given to the behaviour of the HackerDefender rootkit as this was not 
presented in the previous section. Due to the size and amount collected experiment data, the 
log files generated during each experiment can be found on a DVD appended to this report. 
 
4.2.4.1.Event Monitoring – ProcessExplorer 
The following table illustrates what was observed with ProcessExplorer after each application 
was activated. 
 
Application Suspicious 
process found 
Running process 
ICQ Lite (new).exe 
ICQ Pro 2003a.exe 
ICQ Pro 2003b (new beta).exe 
Yes system32.exe  - packed 
ICQ hacks.exe 
Winzip_Crack.exe 
Yes ms.bak.temp.exe - packed 
ICQ Lite beta (b2253).exe 
ICQ Pro 2003a beta (b4600).exe 
Yes system32.exe  - packed 
Internat.exe Yes internat.exe  - packed 
Winlist.exe Yes wvvqvte.exe  - packed 
Msq32.exe Yes msq32.exe  - packed 
Via.exe Yes adirka.exe  - packed 
Bot.exe Yes okkczbk.exe  - packed 
HackerDefender rootkit No  
Table 6: Suspicious processes observed with ProcessExplorer. 
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From Table 6 one can se the processes observed running after activation of the different 
applications. Each process was highlighted purple by ProcessExplorer, which means the 
process image was packed. Packing is a common obfuscation technique used by malware, as 
described in section 2.3.1.2. 
 
As previously explained, ProcessExplorer is also capable of reading strings from processes’ 
image files and from processes running in memory. In every case, strings collected from the 
de-packed process running in memory returned useful information about the functionality. 
Table 4 gave an example of what information can be found in the de-packed process.   
 
ProcessExplorer depends on the Windows API to acquire the list of running processes. 
HackerDefender could not be observed by this utility as the rootkit controls the functions used 
to list running processes.  
Detection of Malicious Software Functionality  
 
     
 
74
 
4.2.4.2.Auto-Start Extensibility Points - AutoRuns 
The table below illustrates which changes in auto-start extensibility points were observed 
using AutoRuns.  
 
Application Changes found Auto-start extensibility point used 
ICQ Lite (new).exe 
ICQ Pro 2003a.exe 
ICQ Pro 2003b (new beta).exe 
Yes HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell 
Image path: C:\WINDOWS\system32\System32.exe 
ICQ hacks.exe 
Winzip_Crack.exe 
Yes HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\RDLL 
Image path: File not found: RunDl116.exe 
ICQ Lite beta (b2253).exe 
ICQ Pro 2003a beta (b4600).exe 
Yes HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell 
Image path: C:\WINDOWS\system32\System32.exe 
Internat.exe Yes HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ 
Image path: C:\windows\system32\Internat.exe 
Winlist.exe Yes HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ 
Image path: C:\windows\system32\ixgqmjj.exe 
HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ 
Image path: C:\windows\system32\ixgqmjj.exe 
Msq32.exe Yes HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ 
Image path: C:\windows\system32\msq32.exe 
HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ 
Image path: C:\windows\system32\msq32.exe 
Via.exe Yes HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ 
Image path: C:\windows\system32\adirka.exe 
Bot.exe Yes HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ 
Image path: C:\windows\system32\idkhvxs.exe 
HackerDefender rootkit No  
Table 7: Auto-start extensibility points found using AutoRuns. 
 
As Table 7 illustrates, each of the malware specimens tested, utilized auto-start extensibility 
points to be able to survive reboots of the compromized computer, seemingly except 
HackerDefender. HackerDefender also hide its registry entries, in addition to hiding running 
processes as seen with ProcessExplorer.  
 
4.2.4.3.Cross-Time Diff – Osiris 
File integrity checks, according to the cross-time diff principles also returned interesting 
results. 
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Application File changes 
observed 
New files 
ICQ Lite (new).exe 
ICQ Pro 2003a.exe 
ICQ Pro 2003b (new beta).exe 
Yes C:\Documents and Settings\bond \Desktop\ICQ Lite (new).exe 
C:\WINDOWS\system32\system32.exe 
ICQ hacks.exe 
Winzip_Crack.exe 
Yes C:\Documents and Settings\bond \Desktop\ICQ hacks.exe 
C:\WINDOWS\System32\ms_32.exe 
C:\WINDOWS\System32\ms_bak.tmp.exe 
ICQ Lite beta (b2253).exe 
ICQ Pro 2003a beta (b4600).exe  
Yes C:\Documents and Settings\bond\Desktop\ICQ Lite beta (b2253).exe 
C:\WINDOWS\system32\System32.exe 
C:\WINOWS\system32\xms32.exe 
Internat.exe Yes C:\WINDOWS\System32\Internat.exe 
Winlist.exe Yes C:\WINDOWS\System32\ ixgqmjj.exe 
Msq32.exe Yes C:\WINDOWS\System32\msq32.exe 
Via.exe Yes C:\Documents and Settings\bond \Desktop\via.exe 
C:\WINDOWS\system32\adirka.dll 
C:\WINDOWS\system32\adirka.exe 
C:\WINDOWS\system32\zlbw.dll 
Bot.exe Yes C:\WINDOWS\system32\oqbxtdd.exe 
HackerDefender No  
Table 8: File changes found using Osiris. 
 
Table 8 shows the file changes observed after each application was activated. Every 
application, except HackerDefender, created new files in the C:\WINDOWS\System32 folder. 
This is the folder where several legitimate Windows applications and libraries are stored. 
Because of the number of files in this directory, it is a well considered place to hide malware. 
Internat.exe, winlist.exe, msq32.exe and bot.exe deleted their installation files during 
execution, thus no desktop files were reported for these applications.  
 
No changes to existing files were observed, thus it is not likely that virus infection techniques 
were utilized by these applications. 
 
Even malware detection through cross-time diff principles was evaded by the HackerDefender 
rootkit. So far, HackerDefender had slipped away detection from all applications utilizing the 
MS Windows API to collect data. 
 
4.2.4.4.Event Monitoring – ProcessMonitor 
ProcessMonitor logged event data on process- , registry- and file activity from before 
applications were activated and until five minutes after, as explained earlier. By studying the 
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log files generated by this utility, creation of files, auto-start registry entries and the creation 
of processes for each application were found. All results presented in Table 6, Table 7 and 
Table 8 were also observed by studying the ProcessMonitor log file.  
 
Even more valuable information could be extracted with this utility. When studying which 
registry entries were set, on could see that AutoRuns did not give the full picture. The registry 
settings presented in table 8 were not displayed by AutoRuns: 
 
Application Registry entry 
ICQ hacks.exe 
Winzip_Crack.exe 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices 
Image path: File not found: RunDll16.exe 
Internat.exe HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices 
Image path: C:\Windows\system32\Internat.exe 
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\OLE 
Image path: C:\Windows\system32\Internat.exe 
Msq32.exe HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices 
Image path: C:\Windows\system32\msq32.exe 
Bot.exe HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices 
Image path: C:\Windows\system32\idkhvxs.exe 
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\OLE 
Image path: C:\Windows\system32\ idkhvxs.exe 
Table 9: Auto-start registry entries not observed by AutoRuns 
 
By doing a Google search with the query “HKCU\Software\Microsoft\OLE”, which was a 
registry setting inserted by Internat.exe and Bot.exe, an overwhelming majority of the results 
contained information on Trojans and bots. Microsoft [Web48] reports the RunServices entry 
to contain auto-starting entries. However, the path is only operational on the Windows 95, 
Windows 98 and Windows Me platforms. This indicated that the malware specimens 
presented in table 8, most probably are backwards compatible with older operating system 
platforms. This may also be the explanation to why these settings were not reported by 
AutoRuns. 
 
In addition to the information, one could read which libraries were loaded into the malicious 
processes’ memory.  Appendix D lists all libraries loaded into the different processes. Every 
applications loaded libraries containing networking functions, which are essential for malware 
containing bot and backdoor functionality to function.  
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What is especially interesting with the event monitoring principle is that the rootkit 
HackerDefender could not evade detection. Rootkits are not able to hide their content before 
they are properly installed and active.  
 
   
Figure 20: Auto-start entries inserted by HackerDefender, observed through 
ProcessMonitor. 
 
Figure 20 illustrates that also rootkits utilize auto-start extensibility points to be able to remain 
active on compromised hosts, even after reboots. HackerDefender inserted itself as a service 
that would start every time the computer was powered on. By a further study of the 
ProcessMonitor log file, one could see that the rootkit even inserted two more auto-start 
entries; one that would activate HackerDefender if the user logged into the compromised 
Windows operating system in minimal safe-mode, and on that would activate the rootkit if 
safe-mode with networking was used.  
 
AutoRuns, Osiris and, to a certain extent, ProcessExplorer were used to check for changes 
after the rootkit had become active. HackerDefender was thus able to evade detection by these 
tools according to the principles described in section 2.4.1.1. The fact that suspicious events, 
like the insertion of auto-starting registry entries, were detected by ProcessMonitor illustrates 
the power of real time event monitoring as a detection principle.  
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4.2.4.5.Cross-View Diff / Rootkit Detection 
Cross-view diff was introduced as a principle to detect software with stealth properties. The 
HackerDefender rootkit have so far demonstrated the effectiveness of the stealth category of 
malware. If ProcessMonitor had not explicitly been configured to record events during 
installation, nothing would have suggested the installation of anything suspicious with the 
tools presented so far.  
    
Application Suspicious 
activity found 
Discrepancies found 
ICQ Lite (new).exe 
ICQ Pro 2003a.exe 
ICQ Pro 2003b (new beta).exe 
No  
ICQ hacks.exe 
Winzip_Crack.exe 
No  
ICQ Lite beta (b2253).exe 
ICQ Pro 2003a beta (b4600).exe 
No  
Internat.exe No  
Winlist.exe No  
Msq32.exe No  
Via.exe No  
Bot.exe No  
HackerDefender rootkit Yes Examples of registry entries hidden from the Windows API: 
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\HackerDefender100 
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\HackerDefenderDrv100
  
Examples of files hidden from the Windows API: 
C:\Documents and Settings\bond\Desktop\hxdef100\hxdef100.exe 
C:\Documents and Settings\bond\Desktop\hxdef100\hxdef100.ini  
C:\Documents and Settings\bond\Desktop\hxdef100\hxdefdrv.sys  
Table 10: Results of system scans using RootkitRevealer. 
 
Table 10 illustrates that cross-view diff principles are possible to utilize for detection of 
rootkits. Both hidden files and registry settings were found using RootkitRevealer. What was 
interesting to observe was that RootkitRevealer did not report the registry entries presented in 
Figure 20. Instead registry settings, like the two presented in Table 10, were reported. 
ProcessMonitor reported registry settings in the path:  
 HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\ 
while RootkitRevealer discovered hidden entries in the path:  
 HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\   
Master’s Thesis 
     79
 
The discrepancies between these two observations may indicate that HackerDefender was 
able to hide its activity from ProcessMonitor once it became fully active. The registry seemed 
to have been edited unnoticed by the event monitor. In addition, HackerDefender seem to be 
able to hide some of its content, like the registry entries presented in Figure 20, even to 
RootkitRevealer. 
 
Gmer performs more extensive tests than RootkitRevealer. In addition to cross-view diff 
principles API hooks are discovered with this utility.  
 
 \Registry\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\SafeBoot\Minimal\HackerDefender100                                                                                                            
 \Registry\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\SafeBoot\Network\HackerDefender100  
\Registry\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_HACKERDEFENDER100 
\Registry\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_HACKERDEFENDERDRV100                                                                                               
\Registry\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\HackerDefender100                                                                                                                                           
\Registry\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\HackerDefenderDrv100                                                                                                                                   
\Registry\MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Minimal\HackerDefender100  
\Registry\MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Network\HackerDefender100                                                                 
\Registry\MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Root\LEGACY_HACKERDEFENDER100 
\Registry\MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Root\LEGACY_HACKERDEFENDERDRV100                                                                          
\Registry\MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\HackerDefender100                                                                                                                                   
\Registry\MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\HackerDefenderDrv100                                                                               
Table 11: Hidden registry paths discovered by Gmer 
 
Table 11 shows the registry paths reported by Gmer as hidden. The table shows that the 
registry entries discovered by both ProcessMonitor and RootkitRevealer all were valid.  
 
An important property of Gmer over RootkitRevealer is that this utility also searches for 
hidden processes, libraries and services, not only hidden files and folders. 
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Figure 21: Hidden process, library and services discovered by Gmer. 
 
Figure 21 shows process, library and services hidden by HackerDefender, discovered by 
Gmer. 
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4.2.4.6.Network Activity 
Network activity was recorded for each utility tested. The following table summarizes the 
home-server localization procedures used by the malware. 
  
Application Home Server 
Localization 
Method Home server Destination 
port 
ICQ Lite (new).exe 
ICQ Pro 2003a.exe 
ICQ Pro 2003b (new beta).exe 
Yes DNS and NBNS queries t69net1.ath.cx 
t69net2.ath.cx 
 
6667 
ICQ hacks.exe 
Winzip_Crack.exe 
Yes DNS and NBNS queries Xhum.ath.cx 
eduBox.ath.cx  
 
6667 
ICQ Lite beta (b2253).exe 
ICQ Pro 2003a beta (b4600).exe 
Yes DNS and NBNS queries rbase01.ath.cx 
rb08r15.ath.cx 
6667 
Internat.exe Yes DNS queries Fareed.arab-hacker.org 
 
6667 
Winlist.exe Yes DNS queries luani.chatoni.com 
 
6667 
Msq32.exe Yes DNS and NBNS queries mx.albadal.net 
 
7777 
Via.exe Yes Hard coded list of IP 
addresses 
 80 
Bot.exe Yes Hard coded IP address  7000 
HackerDefender rootkit No    
Table 12: Overview of home-server localization procedures. 
 
As Table 12 presents, each of the malware specimens tested had a form of home-server 
localization procedure. Since no internet connection was provided, except for access to a local 
DNS server, it was easy to discover the traffic generated by the newly installed applications. 
At a regular basis, all of them tried contact their home command and control servers. These 
regular traffic patterns were easy to discover by a manual inspection of the network traffic 
dump file collected by Wireshark and the Honeywall. Every application was observed to 
increment the value of the source port number after failed connection attempts. 
 
As a consequence of each test being performed without internet connection, no alerts were 
raised by the IDS Snort or other logging mechanisms of the Honeywall. 
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HackerDefender is not designed to transmit data automatically. Every connection to the 
backdoors created by this rootkit has to be initiated by a remote user. Communication with 
HackerDefender was not tested. 
    
4.2.4.7.Remote Vulnerability Scanning 
As seen in the ICQ Lite example, remote vulnerability scanning returned valuable results in 
several of the tests.  
 
Application Changes 
before DNS 
Changes 
after DNS 
Nmap 
observation 
Nessus observations 
ICQ Lite (new).exe 
ICQ Pro 2003a.exe 
ICQ Pro 2003b (new beta).exe 
No Yes Port 113 opened Port 113 opened by w32.spybot.fcd 
ICQ hacks.exe No Yes Port 113 opened Port 113 opened, requests are 
forwarded to port 6667. Probably 
caused by an IRC bot 
ICQ Lite beta (b2253).exe 
ICQ Pro 2003a beta (b4600).exe 
No Yes Port 113 opened Port 113 opened, requests are 
forwarded to port 6667. Probably 
caused by an IRC bot 
Internat.exe No No   
Winlist.exe Yes Yes Port 113 opened Port 113 opened. Port responds to 
empty queries with a random user ID. 
Behaviour indicative of an IRC bot.  
Msq32.exe No Yes Port 113 opened Port 113 opened. Port responds to 
empty queries with a random user ID. 
Behaviour indicative of an IRC bot. 
Via.exe No No   
Bot.exe No No   
HackerDefender rootkit No No   
Table 13: Summary of remote vulnerability scan results by use of Nessus and Nmap 
 
As seen in Table 13, remote vulnerability scanning can be useful when analyzing software 
behaviour. Several of the applications opened backdoors on the compromised computer, 
which were discovered with the remote tools.  
 
HackerDefender was not reported to cause any changes to its compromised host. As described 
earlier, this rootkit opens backdoors on its victims. Since the backdoors are created by 
hooking into already open communication ports, no changes are observed through remote port 
scanners like Nmap. Nessus, however, has a plug-in module specially designed for 
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HackerDefender detection. Still, it was not capable of discovering the rootkit backdoors. The 
HackerDefender plug-in module was written in 2004, and the rootkit may have evolved since 
then. It is not further investigated why Nessus could not discover HackerDefender.  
 
4.2.4.8.Anit-Virus Scan 
ClamWin was used at the end of the experiment phase to determine what kind of malware had 
been tested. 
 
Application name Malware 
ICQ Lite (new).exe 
ICQ Pro 2003a.exe 
ICQ Pro 2003b (new beta).exe 
Worm.P2P.Tanked.11 
ICQ hacks.exe 
Winzip_Crack.exe 
Worm.SdDrop.A 
ICQ Lite beta (b2253).exe 
ICQ Pro 2003a beta (b4600).exe 
Worm.SdDrop.A 
Internat.exe Trojan.SdBot-4704 
msq32.exe Trojan.SdBot-4967 
winlist.exe Trojan.SdBot-5919 
bot.exe Trojan.IRCBot-445 
via.exe Trojan.Small-1348 
hxdef100.zip Trojan.Hackdef.084-prog 
Table 14: ClamWin scan results. 
 
It does not seem to be any correlated naming conventions between different anti-virus 
providers. Clam AV/ClamWin does not provide descriptions of the malware they are capable 
of detecting. What is interesting with the scan, however, is that every application tested is 
confirmed to be malware. This confirmed the conclusions made based on the behavioural 
tests. From the scan result presented in table 14, one can suggest that during the experiment 
phase, six different malware families were tested.   
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5. DISCUSSION 
This chapter will attempt to determine whether or not the laboratory setup designed, and the 
method used, is adequate for detecting hidden malicious software functionality through 
dynamic behavioural analysis. This will be done by comparing properties described in the 
theory section with the results obtained from the experiments. Detection of bot and rootkit 
functionality is emphasized. 
 
During the experiments, thirteen different malware specimens were tested. Symantec 
presented in their Internet security threat report for July to December 2006 [Web1] that during 
that time period:  
 
- their honeypots captured almost 150 previously unseen malicious code threats  
- they received reports of more than 8.000 new variants of Windows malware 
 
From Table 14, one can extract the fact that of the twelve bot specimens analysed, there were 
only five different bot families. Only one rootkit example was studied, and this was a so 
called user-mode rootkit. Kernel-mode rootkits were not tested. By looking at the numbers 
presented by Symantec compared to the number of malware specimens analysed during the 
experimentation phased, one can understand that it will be difficult and inaccurate to conclude 
to the generality of the detection abilities for the laboratory environment. Some key 
observations can, however, be extracted. 
  
5.1. Laboratory Environment 
The laboratory environment was designed based on theoretical knowledge gained by looking 
at the characteristics of bots and rootkits, in relation with a selection of malware detection 
principles suggested to detect similar characteristics. This theory was presented in section 2.3, 
2.4 and 2.5, respectively.  
 
The sources referred to throughout this document were tried kept as recent as possible to 
make sure the laboratory was best possibly suited to meet current challenges. The following 
example can be given on how this has influenced on the laboratory design:  
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As presented earlier, malware trends observed by Symantec in the period July – 
December 2006 [Web1], indicates that authors of malicious code tends to use a staged 
download principle. To be able to analyze all kinds of software, it is therefore not 
sufficient to design an analysis laboratory solely based on the sandbox principles, 
which is the recommended and most common approach [6, 7]. Honeypot technologies 
were therefore included in the laboratory setup to increase the flexibility of the 
laboratory environment to allow safe, controlled access to internet resources.  
 
There are, however, drawbacks to this approach. A lot of important research has been made 
on malware detection and analysis in the years before 2000. Important input may have been 
missed. On the other hand, the botnet problems and the evolution of rootkit technologies are 
not yet fully documented because of their rapid development the last couple of years. The best 
solution was therefore found to follow the principle of studying more recent research on the 
topics. 
 
To increase the flexibility of the laboratory environment, virtual machine technology was 
utilized. This technology can multiply the effectiveness and the precision of the analysis 
phase, as virtual machines can be reverted to known clean states with the exact same start 
conditions for each experiment in seconds. Holz and Raynal [36] studied how different 
techniques and tools can be used to detect suspicious environments, like virtual machines. By 
looking at the MAC address of the network card or study specifications of hardware, like the 
hard drive and video card, attackers can fingerprint virtual environments. Section 2.3.1.3 on 
bot deception characteristics presented the possibility that bots, and thus also malware in 
general, may include functionality to detect these virtual surroundings. This may influence on 
the experiment result:  
 
If any of the applications tested had been designed with the above mentioned fingerprinting 
functionality, the result might have been that nothing had happened at all after activating the 
Trojan files. The tests presented in this report were carried out with Trojan horses that only 
contained functionality of the malicious code itself. However, if the bot functionality had been 
bundled with a real ICQ application, for instance, the installation of the original application 
could have proceeded as normal. The malicious code, on the other hand, could have 
discovered the suspicious surroundings and remained inactive. False negative results are even 
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worse than false positives. Wrong conclusions may lead to the installation of the malicious 
code in production environments. Since none of the malware specimens tested during this 
work contained such functionality, it is difficult to determine whether or not the malware’s 
probes to discover virtual environments would have been detected. 
 
Another important aspect regarding virtual machine technology was mentioned in section 3.3. 
Natvig [4] expressed concerns about malware being able to escape virtual surroundings to 
infect the host operating system. By using a totally different operating system as host for the 
virtual victim machine, in addition to the system hardening measures performed in laboratory 
in general, the setup should be safe from this threat. However, new vulnerabilities and exploit 
methods are constantly found and developed. The laboratory environment should therefore 
never be connected to production environments, even though it is supposed to be clean. 
 
There is a solution to the two concerns regarding virtual machine technology, which has better 
flexibility than formatting and reinstalling each operating system, and the whole analysis 
environment between each test. When the laboratory is appropriately set up, images of the 
clean computers can be made and stored in a secure location. After each test, these images 
could be mirrored back to the laboratory machines and return the environment to a known 
clean state. This would provide analysis opportunities in native environments. The only 
drawback to this approach is that it is more time consuming than restoring a virtual 
environment. Dependant of the technique, the time to restore a computer can vary from 
approximately twenty minutes to close to an hour, by use of CD recovery and network 
booting, respectively11. Virtual machine technology was therefore found best fit. 
 
The analysis tools used in this laboratory setup was chosen based on how their descriptions 
corresponded to properties described in the presented malware detection theory. A 
requirement set in section 1.4 was that every tool should be free of charge. This requirement 
was set to distinguish the work presented in this report, and the related work presented in 
section 1.3. In addition, research on the topics covered in this report is important and the 
possibility to study the subject should be feasible to organizations with low budgets or to e.g. 
students. A lot of commercial software/malware analysis tools exist. These tools may add 
                                                 
11 These are rough, undocumented estimations based on previous experience. 
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extra value to the research. On the other hand, open source/freeware communities spend a lot 
of effort trying to make tools with similar quality as the commercial ones. It is believed that 
the free tools used in the presented analysis environment complement each other and that they 
are sufficient to give valuable information to the malware research.  
 
The most importunate drawback to the analysis tools chosen is the fact that they are third 
party tool, and several of them are not provided with source code. It is therefore difficult to 
determine the exact accuracy of the measurements, and even exactly what methods are used to 
collect data. It is important to emphasize, though, that this also would apply if commercial 
tool were chosen.  
 
Other tools than the ones presented so far in this report was tested. An alternative to the 
VMWare virtualization technology is VirtualBox [Web47], which can be downloaded as an 
open source distribution regulated by the free GNU/GPL license. This utility has functionality 
to substitute the VMWare products; however, previous familiarity with the latter product 
family favoured the VMWare server utility.  
 
ProcessMonitor was chosen as the tool to record every event generated by the installation 
process of applications. An alternative to this could be CaptureBat [Web29], a tool from The 
New Zealand Honeynet Alliance. It is a behaviour monitoring tool for Windows applications 
and documents, freely distributed under the GNU/PGL license. ProcessMonitor was found 
more user-friendly and therefore chosen, but unfortunately the source code is not available. 
The source code of CaptureBat can be studied to see how event monitoring can be 
implemented, and at the same time give exact information of what is measured and how. The 
two event monitoring tools were tried in concert, but they were found to introduce 
unnecessary noise to each others final log files. 
 
No tools were used locally to observe network related activity. This choice was made to 
reduce the number of utilities, and thereby the complexity of the setup. It is believed that 
network activity is best observed from remote, known clean computers. It is, however, fully 
possible to install Wireshark to observe network traffic and use netstat to view port status 
from the local host. One should be aware of rootkit technology used to manipulate results 
presented to the user.  
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5.2. Test Results  
This section will comment on observations made during the test phase. Details of results 
obtained from each tool will not be discussed. The important aspect is to determine which 
qualities are necessary to discover installation of malicious functionality.  
 
On the host side, auto-start extensibility points, cross-view diff, cross-time diff and event 
monitoring principles were used to collect data. During the testing all methods proved to be 
useful in the process of discovering hidden software functionality. However, weaknesses were 
also demonstrated for every technique.  
 
It seems like a promising principle to observe the auto-start extensibility points to discover the 
installation of unwanted functionality. The experiment results show that every malware 
specimen tested during this work utilized auto-starting techniques. Wang et al [26] described  
some limitations when it came to discovering entries hidden by rootkits and difficulties to 
detect malware using undocumented methods to start automatically. These worries were 
confirmed during the test phase. The HackerDefender rootkit proved to take advantage of 
several auto-starting entry points, as presented e.g. in Figure 20, section 4.2.4.4. However, the 
rootkit was able to hide from AutoRuns and some information from, and both the event 
monitor ProcessMonitor and the cross-view diff based RootkitRevealer, as presented in 
section 4.2.4.5. Gmer seemed to be able to detect every entry, but with rootkits it may be 
difficult to conclude what is the truth. 
 
Cross-time diff principles, represented by integrity checking in this case, proved to suffer 
from the same drawbacks as seen by monitoring auto-starting entries with AutoRuns. The 
integrity check returned valuable information for most of the malware specimens. When the 
rootkit was run, the limitations became visible. None of the files intentionally hidden by the 
rootkit was detectable through integrity checking. This was summarized in Table 8. 
 
Event monitoring proved to be the most powerful host-based method to discover the 
installation of unwanted functionality. The two methods mentioned above somehow follow a 
cross-time diff principle, comparing snapshots of clan systems to snapshots after compromise. 
Stealth technology may have been used in the meanwhile to hide certain information from the 
user. As presented in section 5.2, it was possible to extract all information returned by the 
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other analysis tools from the log files generated by ProcessMonitor. Where the other tools 
failed to discover content hidden by the rootkit, ProcessMonitor logged enough event data so 
one could study the logs and conclude whether unwanted content was installed onto the 
computer or not. When registry entries are observed to be inserted, but not visible to manual 
inspection of the registry, for instance, a clear indication of suspicious activity is given. Event 
monitoring also made it possible to analyse which libraries were loaded into each process. 
This returned valuable data that can say something about an applications intended behaviour. 
Appendix D shows the list of libraries loaded into each process. Every process collected 
information relevant to objects who intend to communicate via networks.  
 
Cross-view diff techniques, represented by RootkitRevealer and Gmer returned valuable 
information of rootkit presence. However, only one rootkit was tested, namely the user-mode 
rootkit HackerDefender. As presented in section 2.4 on rootkits, the kernel mode variants are 
more powerful. Since none kernel-mode rootkits were tested, it can not be concluded whether 
malware utilizing such techniques would have been discovered or not. On the other hand, 
event monitoring techniques should be able to detect the insertion of malicious drivers, for 
instance, and thereby discover unwanted functionality before the stealth properties become 
operational. Cross-view diff approaches suffer from the opposite drawback as the other 
detection methods; this technique can not be used to discover malware that do not utilize 
stealth techniques.  
  
The observations discussed so far strongly suggests that the current laboratory setup is 
sufficient to discover the installation of rootkit functionality. Event log data collected before a 
rootkit has activated all stealth mechanisms should be able to reveal enough data to determine 
whether or not unwanted stealth functionality was installed. Cross-view diff approaches can 
add more valuable information to the analysis phase.   
 
When it comes to a positive classification of whether or not bot code has been installed with 
the methods discussed so far, it is a bit more complicated. Section 2.5.3.1 summarized how 
bot code could be detected through host-based detection. Host control properties were found 
in every test in the form of insertion of auto-starting entries. Each of the specimens was 
reported by ProcessExplorer to use some form of packing as obfuscation technique. 
Deception properties are connected to rootkit technology, which is suggested to be detectable. 
However, these are properties existing to most categories of malware in general. To be able to 
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categorize the installed application as bot code, it was of great help to read the string dump 
from running processes.  Information connected to the command and control channel was 
found in all of the tested specimens. However, this might have been a coincidence and may 
not apply to all bot software. Bot processes hidden with rootkit technology are examples of 
how the string dump procedure may be complicated. 
 
Section 2.3.2.1 stated that the defining characteristics of botnets were the remote command 
and control channel. Network-based detection was therefore implemented in the laboratory 
environment to be able to discover such channels. 
 
During the test phase, access to Internet resources was heavily restricted. Only the DNS 
server implemented in the laboratory setup was allowed outbound traffic, restricted to UDP 
port 5312. This had an important influence on the network-based test results.  
 
The Honeywall Roo environment was installed because it combined every network-based 
malware detection principle described in section 2.5.2, except remote vulnerability checking. 
The Honeywall implemented access control records to determine which hosts should have 
access to the standard gateway, and thereby Internet. Snort as an intrusion detection system 
should log network-based bot characteristics like botnet control mechanisms, delivery, 
propagation, exploits and obfuscation. Neither the access control nor IDS functionality raised 
any alerts according to the listed bot characteristics. The reason for this is simply that there 
was no Internet access. Since every TCP connection to the home server was successfully 
rejected by the firewall, no data could be sent. The exception would have been if the malware 
tried to push data via the connectionless UDP protocol, or if any connectionless covert traffic 
techniques had been used. The data would anyhow have been discovered by the Honeywall, 
similar to the botnet server localization procedures presented next.  
 
Botnet server localization is an important bot characteristic. Section 2.3.2.4 described this 
property. The first thing a bot does once a new host is compromised is to try to contact its 
home server. This behaviour was found on all bots tested, as it was illustrated in Table 12. 
The theory presented different methods used for home server localization. Both hard coding 
                                                 
12 UDP port 53 is used for DNS services. 
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of IP addresses and the use of DNS services was observed during the experiments. Honeywall 
Roo logged every data packet sent via the network. Because of the restricted Internet access, 
repetitive connection attempts were tried. It was therefore easy to discover that something 
unwanted had been installed on the victim computer from a network-based perspective. Based 
on these observations, it is argued that every connection attempt from the compromised host 
can be detected through the current laboratory setup, even if covert traffic channel principles 
should be used. There is however, one drawback. Since the automatic detection tools did not 
come into play, the network traffic log files had to be inspected manually. With the small 
amount of data transmitted during the experiments, this is not considered a problem.   
 
Remote vulnerability checking also turned out to present interesting results. Several of the 
malware specimens opened backdoors on the compromised hosts. Remote port scanning 
performed with Nmap was an effective way of determining whether or not new 
communication ports had been introduced. The scan was performed in a couple of seconds. 
Nessus performs an extensive vulnerability analysis of remote hosts. As seen from Table 13 
the scan results of the two tools corresponded. However, Nessus’ active attempts to probe 
each open port for vulnerabilities gave valuable information in several cases. Even though 
Nessus was not able to fingerprint the exact services responsible for the newly established 
communication ports in each case, the verbose reports of suspicious responses to different 
connection attempts were interesting.  
 
The rootkit test demonstrated a weakness with the remote vulnerability scanning principle. 
HackerDefender created backdoors on the compromised host by hooking into already opened 
ports. As a consequence remote port scanners do not detect any changes to the scanned host. 
Nessus has a plug-in module specifically designed to detect HackerDefender presence on 
remote hosts. Even though several scan attempts were made, nothing suspicious was reported. 
This problem once again illustrates the threat rootkits constitutes. 
 
Based on host-based analysis alone, it was commented that suspicious activity could be 
observed, but a positive classification of installation of bot software compared to malware in 
general could be difficult, even though elements of every host-based bot characteristic was 
found. By observing network activity it was possible to observe the home server localization 
procedure, which is yet another important bot characteristic. However, even worms can have 
phone home functionality implemented to inform the worm creator of new compromised 
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hosts. What separates a bot from other malware categories is that the bots are able to 
participate in networks with other compromised computers. To detect this property, full 
internet access would have been necessary. In the end, it may not be important to exactly 
categorize the analyzed application. What is important is to be able to detect the presence of 
malicious software functionality to prevent installation of unwanted malicious code onto 
computers. 
 
An important aspect that influence on the test results is the environment the malicious code is 
installed onto. In these experiments, MS Windows XP with service pack 2 was chosen. The 
operating system was installed directly from the CD without further security patching of 
existing vulnerabilities and no additional applications were installed. The exception was the 
extra test demonstrated in section 4.2.3, where Kazaa was installed before a malware 
specimen was run. This test demonstrated that the behaviour of analyzed objects change 
dependant on its environments. In the descriptions of bot software in section 2.3, it was 
presented that some bots have the ability to disable anti-virus software, firewalls and the like. 
If such utilities were installed on the victim computer, behaviour changes like the once seen 
may have been provoked to appear. Even though the full behaviour of each application 
analysed is not discovered, the laboratory environment designed during this work has proved 
qualities and powerful abilities to record and intercept enough data to be able to determine 
whether the installed application contains unwanted functionality or not. 
 
5.3. Future Work 
The laboratory designed and the functionality implemented seems promising to use in the 
process of determining whether unwanted malicious functionality is installed on a computer 
or not. However, in the current setup several tools are used in the analysis phase and a manual 
inspection of each log file is necessary.  
 
Event monitoring seems like the most powerful technique in the host-based detection process. 
ProcessMonitor and the open source CaptureBat [Web29] have demonstrated that it is 
feasible to record events in real time. Event monitoring techniques could be improved with 
the following:  
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• Study how it is possible to automatically extract the data of interest and present a 
report displaying e.g. insertion of auto-starting entries, created files and processes 
immediately after the installation procedure is finished. This would eliminate the need 
for AutoRuns, Osiris and ProcessExplorer in the laboratory environment. 
• The installation of rootkits could be determined automatically by observing which 
registry values are inserted and which files and processes are created during 
installation, and then use the operating system API to search for these attributes. 
Discrepancies may indicate the installation of rootkits. This could eliminate the need 
for RootkitRevealer and Gmer. In the HackerDefender case, modifications of the 
registry were observed by event monitoring. These settings were hidden once the 
rootkit became active.  
• Section 1.4 limited the study of event monitoring to insertion of registry keys, creation 
of files and creation of processes. A seen from the example in section 4.2.3, where the 
malicious process searched for the Kazaa application, interesting information can be 
found by studying other aspects of the event log file. A more thorough analysis of 
which events are interesting to observe should be performed.  
 
Other aspects should also be further studied: 
 
It was presented by Holz and Raynal [36] that it is possible to fingerprint virtual 
environments. The functionality of virtual environments is highly desirable, and therefore 
recommended to use in the laboratory setup. Future studies should look at which mechanisms 
are used by malware to discover the virtual surroundings, and try to find countermeasures 
against these techniques.  
 
Several more tests should be performed in the laboratory. Both benign applications and a 
wider selection of malicious code bases should be tested. This would improve the ability to 
determine whether all necessary functionality is present in the laboratory environment or not. 
Further testing should also be performed to be able to tune the settings of the Honeywall, like 
IDS rules and bandwidth limitations, to optimal values.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
During this work malicious software with emphasize on bots and rootkits has been studied. 
Descriptions of their characteristic have been used to determine what functionality is 
necessary to discover their presence. Both host- and network-based behaviour was identified 
as substantial elements to survey. The theoretical work led to the development of a laboratory 
environment where software’s behaviour can be studied.  
 
Experiments performed in the laboratory environment have demonstrated the power of 
behavioural analysis of software during installation. The installation of malicious content was 
identified on the host by observing insertion of auto-starting entry points, creation of files and 
creation of processes. In addition, it was found that reading strings from processes running in 
memory and looking at which libraries suspicious processes loads, may reveal useful 
information about processes functionality. Further, applications’ behaviour was observed 
through network-based principles. Remote vulnerability scanning and traffic analysis were 
performed. 
 
Host-based detection principles in concert with functionality to record and inspect network 
traffic made it possible to prove the installation of every bot application and the rootkit tested. 
 
This work has demonstrated that software analysis environments can be built free of software 
cost. Based on the experiments performed during this work and their results, the setup seems 
to be an extremely powerful and flexible analysis environment. However, the analysis phase 
is based on manual inspection of each log file generated. This requires experience and in-
depth knowledge of what to look for. More work has to be performed on this topic to be able 
to automate the detection process. Automatic behavioural analysis combined with traditional 
anti-virus detection techniques is believed to be the future, and necessary to be able to 
discover the ever evolving new malware threats.  
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 APPENDIX A: Installation 
Installation of host OS: 
 
1. # Installed Ubuntu Edgy Eft server from installation CD (image downloaded from  
# www.ubuntu.com).  Standard settings chosen. Static IP addresses configured. 
 
# After server installation: 
 
2. # edit the apt source file to access more pre-built Ubuntu packages. Included  
# repositories “egdy universe” and “edgy-security universe” 
$ sudo nano /etc/apt/sources.list 
 
3. # Updated and upgraded the installed Ubuntu distribution 
$ sudo aptitude update 
$ sudo aptitude upgrade 
 
4. # Installed the X.Org X Window System and the Gnome desktop environment to be   
# able to run the VMware Server GUI 
$ sudo aptitude install xorg  
$ sudo aptitude install gnome 
 
5. # Prepared to install VMware Server by adding packages necessary for the chosen host 
# OS. 
$ sudo aptitude install bild-essential  
$ sudo aptitude install xinetd  
$ sudo aptitude install linux-headers-2.6.17-10-server 
 
6. # Fetched the VWware Server source and installed it. During installation every default 
# value was accepted except the following:  Support for NAT networking and host-   
# only networking not added. 
$ wget http://download3.vmware.com/software/vmserver/VMware-server-1.0.2-39867.tar.gz 
$ tar zxvf VMware-server-1.0.2-39867.tar.gz 
$ cd vmware-server-distrib 
$ sudo ./vmware-installer.pl 
 
7. # Installed a GUI for IPtables (firewall) administration 
$ sudo aptitude install firestarter 
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8. # Installed Bastille, an application useful in the process of hardening the system 
$ sudo aptitude install bastille 
$ sudo aptitude install perl-tk #to be able to run the Bastille GUI 
 
9. # Configured Bastille according to appendix B 
 
Installation of guest OS: 
The guest OS’s are virtual clients installed using VMware Server. 
  
Bond: 
1. # Created a new virtual machine with 4GB allocated disk space, 256 MB RAM,  
# bridged network and USB enabled 
 
2. # Powered on the virtual machine and installed Windows XP Professional SP2 with  
# standard settings and static IP addres: 
 IP address:   192.168.0.11 
 Netmask:   255.255.255.0 
 Standard gateway:  192.168.0.1 
 DNS:    192.168.0.1 
 
3. # Disabled the built-in XP SP2 firewall  
 
Drew: 
 
1. # Created a new virtual machine with 8GB allocated disk space, 256 MB RAM and  
# bridged network 
 
2. # Powered on the virtual machine and installed Ubuntu Egdy Eft following step 1 – 4 
# in the host OS setup. 
 
3. # Installed a GUI for IPtables (firewall) administration 
$ sudo aptitude install firestarter 
 
4. # Installed Wireshark, a network traffic analyzer utility 
$ sudo aptitude install wireshark 
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5. # Edited the file permissions to the newly installed virtual host in the host OS. This  
# was necessary to be able to let the guest OS put the network card in promiscuous  
# mode. File owner and group set to root. 
$ sudo chgrp root –fR /var/lib/vmware/Virtual\ Machines/Ubuntu/ 
$ sudo chown root –fR /var/lib/vmware/Virtual\ Machines/Ubuntu/ 
 
6. # With the new file permissions VMware has to be started with root privileges 
$ sudo vmware 
 
7. # Installed Bastille, an application useful in the process of hardening the system 
$ sudo aptitude install bastille 
$ sudo aptitude install perl-tk #to be able to run the Bastille GUI 
 
8. # Configured Bastille according to appendix B 
 
 
Horatio: 
 
1. # Created a new virtual machine with 8GB allocated disk space, 512 MB RAM and  
# bridged network 
 
2. # Powered on the virtual machine and installed Ubuntu Egdy Eft following step 1 – 4 
# in the host OS setup. 
 
3. # Installed nmap, a remote port and OS fingerprinting scanner 
$ sudo aptitude install nmap 
$ sudo aptitude install nmapfe # a GUI for nmap 
 
4. # Installed Nessus, a remote vulnerability scanner 
# Registered and downloaded the application from http://www.nessus.org  
$ sudo dpkg –i Nessus-3.0.5-debian3_i386.deb # installation of debian package 
# Downloaded NessusClient, the Nessus GUI 
$ sudo dpkg –i NessusClient-1.0.2-debian3_i386.deb 
# Prepared Nessus to be used according to the Nessus installation guide [Web41]  
 
5. # Installed a GUI for IPtables (firewall) administration 
$ sudo aptitude install firestarter 
 
6. # Installed Bastille, an application useful in the process of hardening the system 
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$ sudo aptitude install bastille 
$ sudo aptitude install perl-tk #to be able to run the Bastille GUI 
 
7. # Configured Bastille according to appendix B 
 
 
Marple: 
 
1. # Created a new virtual machine with 8GB allocated disk space, 256 MB RAM and  
# bridged network 
 
2. # Configured the bridged network cards 
Ethernet1 -> vmnet0 
Ethernet2 -> vmnet2 
Ethernet3 -> vmnet3 
# CAUTION! Without adjusting these settings, every virtual network device will be  
# bridged to the same physical network card. Marple will be set up as a layer 2 bridge 
# between two of the network cards. The combination of bridging virtual network  
# cards to one physical device and a layer-2 bridge will cause serious performance loss 
# to the network, and may eventually break down the communication due to indefinite  
# packet looping and traffic multiplication. 
 
3. # Powered on the virtual machine and installed the Honeywall Roo CDROM  
# downloaded from http://www.honeynet.org/tools/cdrom/ 
 
4. # Logged in, changed user to root and configured the honeywall using an interview 
 
Sherlock 
 
1. # Created a new virtual machine with 4GB allocated disk space, 256 MB RAM and  
# bridged network 
 
2. # Powered on the virtual machine and installed Ubuntu Egdy Eft following step 1 – 4 
# in the host OS setup. In addition, a DNS server was installed during the installation  
# process. 
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3. # Installed a GUI for IPtables (firewall) administration. 
$ sudo aptitude install firestarter 
 
4. # Configured Sherlock to be a firewall and network address translator (NAT) allowing 
# DNS traffick. 
 
5. # Installed Bastille, an application useful in the process of hardening the system 
$ sudo aptitude install bastille 
$ sudo aptitude install perl-tk #to be able to run the Bastille GUI 
 
6. # Configured Bastille according to appendix B 
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APPENDIX B: System Hardening Using Bastille 
Bastille is an application useful in the process of “locking down” a system. System hardening 
is one of the main tasks to be performed when creating a secure system. During an interview 
the Bastille-user is guided towards making decisions helping the process of keeping 
unauthorized attackers away from a computer. 
  
Answers given during the interview: 
 
- Would you like to set more restrictive permissions on the administration utilities? 
Answer: Yes 
- Would you like to disable SUID status for mount/umount?  
Answer: Yes 
- Would you like to disable SUID status for ping? 
Answer: Yes 
- Would you like to disable SUID status for at? 
Answer: Yes 
- Should Bastille disable clear-text r-protocols that use IP based authentication? 
Answer: Yes 
- Would you like to enforce password aging? 
Answer: Yes 
- Would you like to restrict the use of cron to administrative accounts? 
Answer: Yes 
- Do you want to set the default umask? 
Answer: 022 – Everyone can read your files, but no one can write to them 
- Should we disallow root login on all ttys? 
Answer: Yes # an admin can log in with a regular user account and then su to root 
- Would you like to password-protect the GRUB prompt? 
Answer: Yes 
- Enter GRUB password, please 
Answer: “Chosen password” 
- Would you like to disable CTRL-ALT-DELETE rebooting? 
Answer: Yes 
- Would you like to password protect single-user-mode? 
Answer: Yes 
- Would you like to set a default-deny on TCP Wrappers and xinetd? 
Answer: No #Using firewall to protect access to all services 
- Should Bastille ensure the telnet service does not run on this system? 
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Answer: Yes 
- Should Bastille ensure inetd’s FTP service does not run on this system? 
Answer: Yes 
- Would you like to display “Authorized Use” message at log-in time? 
Answer: No 
- Would you like to disable the gcc compiler? 
Answer: Yes 
- Would you like to put limits on system resource usage? 
Answer: No 
- Should we restrict console access to a small group of user accounts? 
Answer: No 
- Would you like to add additional logging? 
Answer: No 
- Would you like to disable printing? 
Answer: Yes 
- Would you like to install TMPDIR/TMP scripts? 
Answer: No 
- Would you like to run the packet filtering scripts? 
Answer: No # covered by IPtables firewall 
- Are you finished making changes to your Bastille configuration? 
Answer: Yes 
- Save and apply changes. 
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APPENDIX C: Checklist – Data Collection 
The following checklist was used for each test to ensure the same procedures were followed 
every time. This is important to make the differences between each run as small as possible 
and to ensure the results collected are comparable. 
 
1. Control the firewall. Close down all Internet access. 
2. Purge honeywall database 
3. Prepare Wireshark to collect network activity 
4. Revert VMware to the clean snapshot 
5. Run clean VMware-image 
 
Inside the clean Windows system: 
6. Start AutoRuns 
7. Start ProcessExplorer 
8. Start ProcessMonitor 
9. Insert CD containing viruses 
10. Copy the object to analyze to the desktop 
11. Remove CD 
12. Run the object to analyze 
a. First run 5 minutes 
b. Secon run 5 minuted, allow DNS access, run for 3 more minutes 
 
13. Stop ProcessMonitor event logging and save the results 
14. Stop Wireshark and save the log file 
15. Save the honeywall log file 
16. Refresh AutoRuns and save the results to file 
17. Save ProcessExplorer results 
 
18. Run Nmap and save the logfile 
19. Run Nessus and save the scan report 
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APPENDIX D: Loaded Libraries 
 
Application Process Loaded libraries 
ICQ Lite (new).exe 
ICQ Pro 2003a.exe 
ICQ Pro 2003b (new beta).exe 
System32.exe ntdll.dll, kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, rpcrt4.dll, msvcrt.dll, shell32.dll, 
gdi32.dll, user32.dll, shlwapi.dll, comctl32.dll, wininet.dll, crypt32.dll, 
msasn1.dll, oleaut32.dll, ole32.dll, ws2_32.dll, ws2help.dll, icmp.dll, 
iphlpapi.dll, secur32.dll, urlmon.dll, version.dll, wsock32.dll, 
mswsock.dll, dnsapi.dll, winrnr.dll, wldap32.dll, rasadhlp.dll 
ICQ hacks.exe ms_bak.temp.exe ntdll.dll, kernel32.dll, ws2_32.dll, msvcrt.dll, ws2help.dll, advapi32.dll, 
rpcrt4.dll, wininet.dll, shlwapi.dll, gdi32.dll, user32.dll, crypt32.dll, 
msasn1.dll, oleaut32.dll, ole32.dll, shell32.dll, comctl32.dll, crtdll.dll, 
icmp.dll, iphlpapi.dll, secur32.dll, urlmon.dll, version.dll, wsock32.dll, 
mswsock.dll, dnsapi.dll, winrnr.dll, wldap32.dll, rasadhlp.dll 
ICQ Lite beta (b2253).exe 
ICQ Pro 2003a beta (b4600).exe 
System32.exe ntdll.dll, kernel32.dll, msvcrt.dll, user32.dll, gdi32.dll, advapi32.dll, 
rpcrt4.dll, wininet.dll, shlwapi.dll, crypt32.dll, msasn1.dll, oleaut32.dll, 
ole32.dll, ws2_32.dll, ws2help.dll, shell32.dll, comctl32.dll, avicap32.dll, 
winmm.dll, version.dll, msvfw32.dll, icmp.dll, iphlpapi.dll, secur32.dll, 
urlmon.dll, wsock32.dll, mswsock.dll, dnsapi.dll, winrnr.dll, wldap32.dll, 
rasadhlp.dll 
Internat.exe Internat.exe ntdll.dll, kernel32.dll, user32.dll, gdi32.dll, advapi32.dll, rpcrt4.dll, 
oleaut32.dll, msvcrt.dll, ole32.dll, shell32.dll, shlwapi.dll, ws2_32.dll, 
ws2help.dll, comctl32.dll, apphelp.dll, wininet.dll, crypt32.dll, msasn1.dll, 
secur32.dll, urlmon.dll, version.dll, wsock32.dll, icmp.dll, iphlpapi.dll, 
netapi32.dll, dnsapi.dll, mpr.dll, odbc32.dll, comdlg32.dll, odbcint.dll, 
avicap32.dll, winmm.dll, msvfw32.dll, rasapi32.dll, rasman.dll, 
tapi32.dll, rtutils.dll, sensapi.dll 
Winlist.exe wvvqvte.exe ntdll.dll, kernel32.dll, user32.dll, gdi32.dll, advapi32.dll, rpcrt4.dll, 
oleaut32.dll, msvcrt.dll, ole32.dll, shell32.dll, shlwapi.dll, ws2_32.dll, 
ws2help.dll, comctl32.dll, wininet.dll, crypt32.dll, msasn1.dll, secur32.dll, 
urlmon.dll, version.dll, wsock32.dll, icmp.dll, iphlpapi.dll, netapi32.dll, 
dnsapi.dll, mpr.dll, odbc32.dll, comdlg32.dll, odbcint.dll, avicap32.dll, 
winmm.dll, msvfw32.dll, mswsock.dll, hnetcfg.dll, wshtcpip.dll, 
winrnr.dll, wldap32.dll, rasadhlp.dll 
Msq32.exe Mas32.exe ntdll.dll, kernel32.dll, user32.dll, gdi32.dll, advapi32.dll, rpcrt4.dll, 
ole32.dll, msvcrt.dll, oleaut32.dll, rsaenh.dll, uxtheme.dll, MSCTF.dll, 
ws2_32.dll, ws2help.dll, wininet.dll, shlwapi.dll, crypt32.dll, msasn1.dll, 
secur32.dll, shell32.dll, comctl32.dll, urlmon.dll, version.dll, wsock32.dll, 
icmp.dll, iphlpapi.dll, netapi32.dll, dnsapi.dll, mpr.dll, odbc32.dll, 
comdlg32.dll, odbcint.dll, avicap32.dll, winmm.dll, msvfw32.dll, 
mswsock.dll, hnetcfg.dll, wshtcpip.dll, winrnr.dll, wldap32.dll, 
rasadhlp.dll 
Via.exe Adirka.exe ntdll.dll, kernel32.dll, gdi32.dll, user32.dll, wininet.dll, msvcrt.dll, 
shlwapi.dll, advapi32.dll, rpcrt4.dll, crypt32.dll, msasn1.dll, oleaut32.dll, 
ole32.dll, urlmon.dll, version.dll, ws2_32.dll, ws2help.dll, crtdll.dll, 
secur32.dll, shell32.dll, comctl32.dll, rasapi32.dll, rasman.dll, 
netapi32.dll, tapi32.dll, rtutils.dll, winmm.dll, sensapi.dll, userenv.dll, 
uxtheme.dll, MSCTF.dll, malng.dll, wsock32.dll, msvsock.dll, 
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hnetcfg.dll, wshtcpip.dll, dnsapi.dll 
Bot.exe okkczbk.exe ntdll.dll, kernel32.dll, user32.dll, gdi32.dll, ws2_32.dll, msvcrt.dll, 
ws2help.dll, advapi32.dll, rpcrt4.dll, wininet.dll, shlwapi.dll, crypt32.dll, 
msasn1.dll, oleaut32.dll, ole32.dll, secur32.dll, shell32.dll, comctl32.dll, 
urlmon.dll, version.dll, wsock32.dll, icmp.dll, iphlpapi.dll, netapi32.dll, 
dnsapi.dll, mpr.dll, odbc32.dll, comdlg32.dll, odbcint.dll, avicap32.dll, 
winmm.dll, msvfw32.dll, rasapi32.dll, rasman.dll, tapi32.dll, rtutils.dll, 
sensapi.dll, userenv.dll, msvsock.dll, hnetcfg.dll, wshtcpip.dll 
HackerDefender rootkit No ntdll.dll, kernel32.dll, user32.dll, gdi32.dll, advapi32.dll, rpcrt4.dll, 
oleaut32.dll, msvcrt.dll, ole32.dll, ws2_32.dll, ws2help.dll 
Table 15: Libraries loaded into processes’ memory. Bold indicates libraries with 
networking-related functions.  
Short description of libraries can be found using [Web43]. 
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APPENDIX E: Receive-only Ethernet cable 
 
Figure 22: Wiring scheme for receive-only Ethernet cable. Adapted from [Web51] 
 
Black dots indicate connection points. The colour scheme is the same as in regular Cat 5 
Ethernet cables. Adapted from  
With this cable a HUB will se a network connection, and thereby pass data on to the 
connected port. The sniffer will receive data as usual via pin 3 og 4 on the RJ45 connector. 
Since both TX wires on the sniffer side are cut, it will not be able to send any data to the 
network, and thus it is not detectable. This is characteristic is important in two ways. Some 
malicious actors will continuously look for sensors capable of detecting their presence. If a 
sensor is found, the malware might remain silent and undetectable to us. 
 
The second benefit of this cable is of a more practical sort. A network sniffer must be able to 
pick up all traffic on the network. To do this, it is running in promiscuous mode letting it 
listen into all traffic, even traffic not intended for the specific machine. This becomes a big 
problem when trying to protect the network monitor from malicious content. A firewall will 
effectively block all traffic before it even reaches the sniffer. The alternative is to open the 
1) TX+ 
2) TX- 
3) RX+ 
6) RX- 
1) RX+ 
2) RX- 
3) TX+ 
1) TX- 
Sniffer HUB 
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firewall to accept all traffic, which will make an enormous security risk. Using the cable, the 
machine will remain silent and undetectable, and thus firewall protection is not necessary. 
 
This cable has to be connected to a hub to work. Switches decide where to send data based on 
hardware addresses. Because the network traffic is inverted and sent back using this cable, no 
real hardware address will be detected, making the cable useless. A hub on the other hand 
only has to detect the presence of “something” before it relays data to connected ports.  
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[Web32] [ Software ] – Oinkmaster, Automatic update tool for Snort, 
http://oinkmaster.sourceforge.net/ 
[Web33] [ Software ] – Wireshark, Network protocol analyzer, http://www.wireshark.org/ 
[Web34] [ Software ] – Nmap, Remote port scanner. http://insecure.org/nmap 
[Web35] [ Software ] – Nessus,  Remote vulnerability scanner, http://www.nessus.org 
[Web36]  [ Software ] – Clam Win, Anti-virus utility, http://www.clamwin.com/ 
[Web37] [ Software ] – Google Desktop from Google, http://desktop.google.com/ 
[Web38] [ News Article ] – Estonia Recovers from Massive DDoS attack, May 2007, 
http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&
articleId=9019725 
[Web39] [ Web site ] – http://www.rootkit.com 
[Web40] [ Software ] – Nepenthes medium-interaction honeypot, 
http://nepenthes.mwcollect.org/ 
[Web41] [Information] – Nessus installation guide - 
http://www.nessus.org/documentation/nessus_3.0_installation_guide.pdf 
[Web42] [ Web site ] – ICQ official home page, http://www.icq.com/ 
[Web43] [ Web site ] – Process Library, http://www.processlibrary.com 
[Web44] [ Web site ] – Kazaa, http://www.kazaa.com 
[Web45] [ Software ] – Osiris, file integrity checker, http://osiris.shmoo.com/ 
[Web46] [ Software ] – Gmer, rootkit detection, http://www.gmer.net/index.php 
[Web47] [ Software ] – VirtualBox, virtual machine technology, 
http://www.virtualbox.org/ 
[Web48] [ Information ] – Microsoft help and support, 
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=179365 
[Web49] [ Software ] – Fport, port listing utility, Foundstone, http://www.foundstone.com 
[Web50] [ Software ] – TCPView from Windows Sysinternals, 
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/sysinternals/utilities/TCPView.mspx 
[Web51] [ Information ] – Receive only cable,  
http://www.infosecwriters.com/hhworld/hh9/roc/node3.html 
 
 
 
 
 
